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In our new era of advanced technology, creative robots,
driven by sophisticated artificial intelligence systems and hence
acting autonomously, are capable of producing innovative
artistic and other works—ones which, had they been created by
humans, would be eligible for copyright protection. This article
addresses the question of copyrightability of artworks created by
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creative robots. We argue that creative robots as autonomous
entities are capable of holding copyrights in artworks they
produce. However, the greatest hurdle to this notion, from the
copyright law point of view, is the interpretation of the most
important concept in copyright protection: the requirement of
originality. Therefore, in this article, we are revisiting the concept
of originality. This article argues that confronting the challenges
of the new 3A era (advanced, automated and autonomous) calls
for a reassessment of the meaning of originality, which is
undefined in the field of copyright protection both in
international law, under the Berne Convention, and in domestic
U.S. copyright law. The lack of a clear definition means that the
existing concept of originality is inadequate for addressing new,
possibly “copyrightable” works produced by creative robots.
Moreover, the lack of a clear definition leads to interpretations of
“originality” that are vague, immeasurable, and disharmonized,
and already causes confusion in the industry as well as the
public. This uncertainty surrounding an important legal concept
has triggered a search for a solution that could eliminate or, at
the very least, reduce future conflicts. This article suggests that a
more formal, objective approach—as opposed to the existing,
subjective (or mixed) approach—to the concept of originality
should be adopted. The proposed objective approach might be
applicable to works created by creative robots as well as artworks
generated by digital tools and is further warranted by the
intangible, vague nature of art. We suggest that a consistent legal
determination of the question “what is original?” can successfully
be achieved only by a formal, objective, descriptive approach.
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INTRODUCTION
“Four hundred years after the death of the old master,
Rembrandt van Rijn, a new Rembrandt has been unveiled to the
world, or at least, the Next Rembrandt.”1 Next Rembrandt is a
new project that digitizes the painting method of Rembrandt
with the goal of creating computer-generated artwork.2 Once
exposed to open data, the program will be capable of not only
replicating existing paintings, but also producing entirely new,

1. Steve Schlackman, The Next Rembrandt: Who Holds the Copyright in
Computer Generated Art, ART L. J. (Apr. 22, 2016), http://artlawjournal.com/thenext-rembrandt-who-holds-the-copyright-in-computer-generated-art
(describing the first goal of the project as “discover[ing] if an algorithm . . . could
produce a physical work of art that could mimic the look of a genuine
Rembrandt painting.”). The project was launched by ING and the J. Walter
Thompson agency, along with their partners Microsoft, TU Delft, Mauritshuis,
and Rembrandthuis. Id.
2. See id.
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creative, and original artwork.3 The project is the result of
collaboration between data scientists, engineers, and art
historians, who are studying Rembrandt’s painting techniques,
his style, and his subject matter in order to build a computer
program capable of creating innovative artwork.4 If humans, not
digital systems, had created such works, they would be
copyrightable, but projects such as Next Rembrandt blur the
boundary between technology and art, creating new challenges
to the copyright regime in general.5 This new reality requires a
reevaluation of the concept of originality as applied to artwork.
Creative robots driven by automated machines, artificial
intelligence (AI) systems, and machine learning software
(hereinafter, creative robots or AI systems) have already become
part of our daily lives. Automated AI systems play a role in many
fields, including diagnostic medicine,6 transportation,7
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See The Next Rembrandt, The Next Rembrandt, YOUTUBE (Apr. 5,
2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IuygOYZ1Ngo (depicting how the
team began with an in-depth study of the proportions and features of the faces
in Rembrandt’s works). To master his style, the project team
designed a software system that could understand Rembrandt based
on his use of geometry, composition, and painting materials. A facial
recognition algorithm identified and classified the most typical
geometric patterns used by Rembrandt to paint human features. It
then used the learned principles to replicate the style and generate new
facial features for [the new] painting.”
Id.
6. See Fazal Khan, The “Uberization” of Healthcare: The Forthcoming
Legal Storm over Mobile Health Technology’s Impact on the Medical Profession,
26 HEALTH MATRIX (2016) (discussing the eventual likely rise of mobile health
supplementing or replacing traditional providers of healthcare); Jolene
Creighton, AI Saves Woman’s Life by Identifying Her Disease When Other
Methods (Humans) Failed, FUTURISM (Aug. 5, 2016), http://futurism.com/aisaves-womans-life-by-identifying-her-disease-when-other-methods-humansfailed (“If you needed proof that the age of artificial intelligence is officially upon
us, well, look no farther. Reports assert that IBM’s artificial intelligence (AI)
system, Watson, just saved the life of a Japanese woman by correctly identifying
her disease. This is notable because, for some time, her illness went undetected
using conventional methods, and doctors were stumped.”).
7. See Caitlin Brock, Where We’re Going, We Don’t Need Drivers: The Legal
Issues and Liability Implications of Automated Vehicle Technology, 83 UMKC
L. REV. 769, 770–73 (2015) (citing the many benefits of automated vehicles); Ray
Kurzweil, The Virtual Thomas Edison, TIME (Dec. 3, 2000) (describing the
issues raised by automated cars); Ionut Alexandru Budisteanu, Using Artificial
Intelligence to Create a Low Cost Self-Driving Car, BUDISTEANU TECH BLOG,
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investment,8 and combat (e.g. automated weapons or war
robots),9 as well as many lesser-known areas, such as therapy,10
intelligence gathering,11 and social policymaking.12 Even legal
http://budisteanu.net/Download/ISEF%202%20Autonomous%20car%20Doc%2
0particle.pdf (describing the achievability of creating a car with the ability to
drive automatically and autonomously in an urban area). In 2004, car accidents
caused 2.5 million deaths worldwide and injured 50 million people. 87% of the
crashes were due solely to driver errors. Most of the components of self-driving
cars have already been completed, and the system is able to recognize traffic
signs and register them in a common database using Google Maps, GPS, and
other tools. Id.
8. See Nizan Geslevich Packin & Yafit Lexv-Aretz, Big Data and Social
Netbanks: Are You Ready to Replace Your Bank?, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 1211, 1222
(2016) (describing how most financial institutions in North America use big
data analysis and how banks are adopting technological tools).
9. See Rebecca Crootof, The Killer Robots Are Here: Legal and Policy
Implications, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1837, 1840–43, 1863–71, 1894–1901 (2015)
(describing how AI weapons systems with varying levels of autonomy have
already been integrated into the armed forces of numerous states, and calling
for a definition of Autonomous Weapon System and international regulations
thereof); Roberto Baldwin, The Robots of War: AI and the Future of Combat,
ENGADGET (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.engadget.com/2016/08/18/robots-ofwar-ai-and-the-future-of-combat (arguing that the future of warfare will be
filled with AI and robots, and whoever builds the best artificial intelligence will
win the conflict).
10. See Hideki Kozima et al., Keepon: A Playful Robot for Research,
Therapy, and Entertainment, 1 INT’L J. SOC. ROBOTICS 3, 3 (2009); Jonathan
Amos, Love Lab Predicts Marital Outcome, BBC NEWS (Feb. 13, 2004), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/3484981.stm (reporting that scientists have
created a mathematical model that predicts which marriages will end in
divorce).
11. See James Bamford, The NSA Is Building the Country’s Biggest Spy
Center, WIRED (Mar. 15, 2012, 7:24 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel
/2012/03/ff_nsadatacenter; Jasper Hamill, Eyes in the Sky: CIA Training
Artificial Intelligence to Spy on Earth from Space Using ‘Computer Vision’, THE
SUN (Aug. 25, 2016, 5:19 PM), https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/1673802/ciatraining-artificial-intelligence-to-spy-on-earth-from-space-using-computervision (reporting that CosmiQ Works, a firm closely related to the CIA, is
working with Amazon and DigitalGlobe, a satellite mapping firm, to train AI
algorithms to use “computer vision” to spy on Earth).
12. See Rob Kling, Automated Information Systems as Social Resources in
Policy Making, 78 ACM 666 (1978), http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=810109
(documenting that automated information systems have been suggested by a
number of theorists to aid public policymakers in acquiring more accurate,
timely, and relevant information). This article reports a study of the uses and
impacts of automated systems for policy analysis in forty-two municipal
governments. Id. The study demonstrates that automated analyses are
commonly used in municipal governments to support policy suggestions, which
are often implemented. Id. Automated systems in these settings serve both
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systems have not escaped the influence of automated AI
systems, which play a role in the creation, and possibly even the
enforcement, of legal tools and methods, such as the practice of
law,13 alternative dispute resolution,14 contract drafting,15 and
more.16
The production of automated AI machines has been
consistently and rapidly growing, with the AI industry forecast
to become a $70 billion industry by 2020.17 The fact that the AI
industry is also actively involved in the creative production of
educational and political aims. Id. But see Jack M. Balkin, The Three Laws of
Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (finding
that a characteristic feature of the Algorithmic Society is that new technologies
permit both public and private organizations to govern large populations).
Behind robots, artificial intelligence agents, and algorithms are governments
and businesses—organized and staffed by human beings—that exercise power
over other human beings mediated through new technologies. Id. Balkin argues
that it is therefore important to keep in mind three rules: good faith, private
owners’ fiduciary obligations to the public, and transparency. Id.
13. See Michael Mills, Using AI in Law Practice: It’s Practical Now, LAW
PRAC. MAG., July–Aug. 2016, at 48; Jessica Chasmar, Stanford Student’s Robot
Has Beaten 160,000 Parking Tickets, WASH. TIMES (June 29, 2016), http://www
.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jun/29/joshua-browder-stanford-studentsrobot-lawyer-has-/; This Robot Lawyer Could Help You Get Your Parking Ticket
Dismissed, CBS NEWS (July 26, 2016), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/donotpaybot-lawyer-helps-dismiss-parking-tickets-joshua-browder (reporting that the
robot lawyer had already saved drivers an estimated $4–5 million).
14. See David Allen Larson, Artificial Intelligence: Robots, Avatars, and the
Demise of the Human Mediator, 25 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 105 (2010); Arno
R. Lodder & John Zeleznikow, Artificial Intelligence and Online Dispute
Resolution, in ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION THEORY AND PRACTICE (Mohamed
Abdel Wahab, Ethan Katsh & Daniel Rainey eds., 2013).
15. See Lauren Henry Scholz, Algorithmic Contracts, 20 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2017) (arguing that understanding the existence of
algorithms as servants rather than mere tools justifies the creation and analysis
of a distinct category called “algorithmic contracts”). Machine learning enables
sophisticated algorithms to be more similar in function to a human employee
with a task to achieve than to a tool. Id.
16. See Edwina L. Rissland, Kevin D. Ashley & Ronald P. Loui, AI and Law:
A Fruitful Synergy, 150 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 1 (2003) (arguing that AI
and the Law is a classic field for AI research).
17. See Reuters, Tech CEOs Declare This the Era of Artificial Intelligence,
FORTUNE (June 3, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/06/03/tech-ceos-artificialintelligence (reporting that tech companies are diving into AI analytics
research, an industry that will grow from just $8.2 billion in 2013 to $70 billion
by 2020). The article describes Elon Musk’s remarks as such: “Artificial
intelligence and machine learning will create computers so sophisticated and
godlike that humans will need to implant ‘neural laces’ in their brains to keep
up[.]” Id.
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intellectual property works, including “copyrightable” works,
represents the 3A Era of Advanced, Automated, and
Autonomous digital tools. An unforgettable scene in the film ExMachina, in which Eva (a robot) gives Caleb (a human) a
drawing she created as a gift to capture his heart, illustrates this
new reality: creative robots can create original works—ones that
have neither been copied nor infringe the rights associated with
other works.18 However, copyrightable works created by creative
robots do not exist only in science-fiction movies. Creative robots
and other AI-like systems currently produce original works in
almost every copyrightable medium: literature,19 poetry,20
news,21 music,22 and other branches of visual arts.23
The fact that creative robots and other forms of AI systems
can autonomously create original works—independently of the
human beings who created the AI system itself—raises many
legal questions. Are these works copyrightable as original
artwork? Who would own the copyright, including all the rights
flowing from that ownership (e.g. licenses, royalties, rights to
remedies for infringement of the works)? Who is entitled to the

18. EX-MACHINA (Universal Pictures International 2015).
19. See Alison Flood, Computer Programmed to Write Its Own Fables,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/aug/06
/computer-programmed-to-write-fables-moral-storytelling-system.
20. See Samuel Gibbs, Google AI Project Writes Poetry Which Could Make
a Vogon Proud, GUARDIAN (May 17, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com
/technology/2016/may/17/googles-ai-write-poetry-stark-dramatic-vogons
(reporting that Google, Stanford University, and others are working on an
artificial intelligence program that will write poems after exposing the program
to novels).
21. See Lin Weeks, Note, Media Law and Copyright Implications of
Automated Journalism, 4 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 67 (2014)
(discussing examples of news created by machines, but leaving open the
questions regarding copyright); Steve Lohr, In Case You Wondered, a Real
Human Wrote This Column, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2011), http://www.nytimes
.com/2011/09/11/business/computer-generated-articles-are-gainingtraction.html.
22. See William T. Ralston, Copyright in Computer-Composed Music: HAL
Meets Handel, 52 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 281, 306 (2005) (“The question of
whether machine-generated expression is a proper subject for copyright has
been, and probably will continue to be, a subject of continued debate.”).
23. See Peter Kugel, Artificial Intelligence and Visual Art, LEONARDO,
Spring 1981, at 137 (describing computers’ means of “thinking” and how this
relates to the creation of visual artwork).
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moral rights?24 Many of these questions depend on the
identification of the legal entity that can be considered the
creator, which depends on a prior discussion about the definition
of originality. This discussion is the focus of this article.
The AI systems of today can best be described as sharing ten
characteristics: they are (1) innovative, (2) autonomous, (3)
unpredictable, (4) independent, (5) rational-intelligent, (6)
evolving and capable of learning, (7) efficient, (8) accurate, (9)
goal oriented, and (10) capable of processing free choice—all
features that make these systems inherently intelligent.25 The
ability of these systems to create original artwork constitutes the
basis for the following debate on the concept of originality.
We argue that in the case of artworks produced by creative
robots, the source of subjective originality is no longer relevant.
In this sense, works created by creative robots or other AI
systems can be considered an impetus for revisiting our
understanding of the traditional concept of originality.
Traditionally, intellectual property (IP) laws, and in particular,
copyright laws, have been based on a human creator, who
creatively, originally, and independently creates a work from
within his or her mind and soul in a way that reflects his or her
personality.26 Even the law and economics rationales are focused

24. See Xiyin Tang, The Artist as Brand: Toward a Trademark Conception
of Moral Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 218 (2012); Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, Rethinking
Employees’ Intellectual Property Moral Rights: A New Model, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE 70–71 (Miriam Bitton & Lior
Zemer eds., 2012), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2132704 (comparing the laws in France and Germany, which provide strong
legal protection for moral rights to authors and creators, including employed
creators, to the law in the United States, which diminishes moral rights
dramatically and totally negates moral rights in regard to employees).
25. Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid & Xiaoqiong (Jackie) Liu, When
Artificial Intelligence Systems Produce Inventions: The 3A Era and an
Alternative Model for Patent Law, CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2931828.
26. See Colin R. Davies, An Evolutionary Step in Intellectual Property
Rights – Artificial Intelligence and Intellectual Property, 27 COMPUTER L. &
SECURITY REV. 601 (addressing and analyzing the issue of ownership of
computer-generated works within patent and copyright law, and concluding
that the current regime is woefully inadequate to deal with the growing use of
more and more intuitive artificial intelligence systems in the production of such
works). It considers the respective claims of interested parties to such rights
before moving on to a consideration of the creation of a new legal personality to
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on incentive as a human trait.27 However, in acknowledging how
creative robots produce their work, we realize, perhaps for the
first time, that there is no human behind their creations. It is
the automated AI system, representing the 3A era, that creates
and produces the potentially copyrightable works by itself. We
argue that there exists a great tension between the traditional
notion of human creators, who are entitled to copyright on the
fruits of their creative labor, and creative robots, which
autonomously and independently produce new works. This
discord between art, creation, and machines demands further
investigation and clarification.
This article addresses the modern-day challenge of applying
existing copyright laws to this new category of works. We argue
that creative robots can be considered the authors. However,
traditional copyright laws are unsuited to dealing with the
copyrightable works produced by creative robots in light of
technological advances. Current IP law and policy will most
likely not survive this technological revolution as is, which is
why we must be prepared to replace the current understandings
of the legal system with some alternative meanings. This article
focuses on revisiting the concept of originality with the result of
adopting a new understanding of this concept.
We contend that the traditional approach to copyright law
focuses on protecting the human being behind the machine.
Under this approach, once we identify a human being (or an
entity as transferee), we can identify the party who will be
responsible for the work and, consequently, the target of the
law.28 This known reality, in which only human beings are
creators, has been the reason to preserve the law “as is.” We
argue that, when dealing with creative robots, this traditional
approach should adopt new modifications. This dilemma

which such rights could be granted to resolve the difficulties inherent in the
current system. Id.
27. Naci Mocan & Kaj Gittings, The Impact of Incentives on Human
Behavior: Can We Make It Disappear? The Case of the Death Penalty, in THE
ECONOMICS OF CRIME: LESSONS FOR AND FROM LATIN AMERICA 379–81 (Rafael
Di Tella, Sebastian Edwards & Ernesto Schargrodsky eds., 2010) (describing an
empirical analysis testing the economic model of crime, which has demonstrated
that illicit behavior responds to incentives and sanctions).
28. See infra text accompanying notes 60–61 (discussing the National
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU)).
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demands that we rethink the way we define and apply existing
legal terms such as “originality.”
Take, for example, an interesting story concerning the town
of Borja in the Spanish province of Zaragoza.29 A lady, Cecilia
Gimenez, acting entirely with good intentions, took on the task
of restoring a 120-year old fresco in the Sanctuary of Mercy
(Santuario de Misericordia).30 Ms. Gimenez’s “restoration”
resulted in a “botched” work, but one that was also an entirely
new painting. After a long period of exposure in the news, this
“botched” artwork became an international sensation and a
common topic in intellectual property classes and blogs.31 The
“botched” work began to appear on T-shirts and postcards. The
owner of the building, which might be described as the “tangible
medium” of the preexisting artwork, began collecting increased
donations from the public as a result of exhibitions of the
“botched” version.32 However, none of the money collected ended
up in the pockets of the lady responsible for the so-called
“botched” painting.33 Now, if we imagine that Ms. Gimenez, the
creator, was actually a creative robot instead of a human being,
we must ask the following questions: Can the artwork be
considered an “original”? Is Ms. Gimenez, the robot, or anyone
on its behalf, entitled to royalties for reproduction profits?34 This
example demonstrates the very real difficulties presented by the

29. See generally Jonathan Jones, Great Art Needs a Few Restoration
Disasters, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 23, 2012, 7:30 AM EDT), http://www.guardian
.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/aug/23/great-art-restoration-disasters (introducing
the Ecce Homo fresco and Ms. Gimenez’s attempt at restoration).
30. Id.
31. See Art Attack: Pensioner Destroys Church Fresco, SKY NEWS (Aug. 23,
2012, 10:18 AM UTC), http://news.sky.com/story/976008/art-attack-pensionerdestroys-church-fresco; Jones, supra note 29; Stacey Leasca, Art World Rejoices
Over ‘Botched’ Restoration, GLOBALPOST (Aug. 24, 2012, 6:55 PM UTC), http://
www.globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpost-blogs/weird-wide-web/art-worldrejoices-over-botched-restoration; Barry Neild, Ecce Homo ‘Restorer’ Wants a
Slice of the Royalties, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 20, 2012, 4:14 PM EDT), http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/sep/20/ecce-homo-cecilia-gimenez-royalties;
Amy Willis, Elderly Woman Destroys 19th-Century Fresco with DIY Restoration,
THE TELEGRAPH (Aug. 22, 2012, 10:26 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture
/art/9491391/Elderly-woman-destroys-19th-century-fresco-with-DIYrestoration.html.
32. Art Attack, supra note 31; Jones, supra note 29; Neild, supra note 31.
33. Neild, supra note 31.
34. Id.
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vagueness of the term “originality” in Intellectual Property and
copyright law.
We argue that policymakers need to rethink the concepts of
originality and authorship within the international and U.S.
legal systems. In searching for answers to the legal questions
presented by the scenario described above, the absence of a
concrete definition of “originality” under copyright law is
undoubtedly troublesome.35 Although originality is one of the
most important concepts of copyright protection,36 the absence of
a definition of “originality” and the variety of standards for
assessing “originality” frequently result in uncertainty
regarding the copyright protections of artwork.37 This problem
is only exacerbated when one examines works produced by
creative robots.
To avoid this confusion, this article proposes a formal,
descriptive, and objective approach to the concept of “originality”
in artwork. This approach represents an entirely new model
from the current one, which has a number of flaws. First, the
level of originality required by the current U.S. standards varies
from one case to another. Second, the jurisprudence provides
definitions of “originality” that better describe how to attain
originality than how to perceive or recognize it. Third, the lack
of uniformity across jurisdictions creates a burden for the
advancement of creativity in works, especially when discussing
original works produced by creative robots.
In seeking to propose an effective approach for the
formalization of originality—one that is also capable of
recognizing works produced by creative robots—the first part of
this article discusses creative robots as potential authors of
artworks they produce. The second part describes the
international and domestic concepts of “originality.” It closely
examines the lack of a clear definition for such an important
criterion, highlighting the differences that exist with respect to
the originality requirement. The third part of this article
confronts the dilemma of the subjective and objective
approaches, concluding that the objective approach is preferable.

35. See 17 U.S.C. (2012) (including no definition of “originality”).
36. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345
(1991) (“The sine qua non of copyright is originality.”).
37. See discussion infra Section II.B.
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This part proposes a new model of formal “originality.” Finally,
the fourth part examines the traditional current copyright
regime regarding the copyrightability of works produced by
creative robots.
I.

CAN CREATIVE ROBOTS BE THE AUTHORS OF
ARTWORKS?

Creative robots already produce a tremendous number of
creative works which could be copyrightable.38 Imagine a
portrait produced by a creative robot. The artist is not a human
being, but rather a robot driven by artificial intelligence
systems. The subject of the portrait is unknown to the human
operators of the AI system until the creative robot has generated
the image. Such a creation cannot meet the subjective concept of
originality. However, the portrait might meet the concept of
objective originality suggested by this article and hence, would
be copyrightable.39
A. SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY
As one of us argues in another article, creative robots are,
among the ten features, autonomous, creative, independent, and
unpredictable to the developers or operators, and therefore, they
can be eligible to authorship.40 In order for a work to be eligible
for copyright protection, it must principally satisfy three
criteria—a minimum amount of creativity, fixation, and, most
important, originality. First, the work must have a minimum
level of creativity. Second, the work must exist in a tangible
medium. Third, the work must be original in a vague sense. For
a work to qualify as subject matter eligible for copyright

38. See, e.g., the discussion on patents in Aashish R. Karkhanis & Jenna L.
Parenti, Toward an Automated First Impression on Patent Claim Validity:
Algorithmically Associating Claim Language with Specific Rules of Law, 19
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 196 (2016).
39. Schlackman, supra note 1.
40. Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 25; see also Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid &
Samuel
Moorhead,
Generating
Rembrandt: Artificial Intelligence,
Accountability and Copyright - The Human-Like Workers Are Already Here - A
New Model, MICH. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017). The article was awarded as
the best article of 2017 in intellectual property by Michigan State University.
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protection, it must satisfy all three elements.41 Only works that
meet all three criteria are copyrightable.42 This is also true
regarding creative robots. As long as these conditions are
satisfied, the works produced by creative robots may obtain
copyright protections. This would be similar to inventive robots,
which are operated by artificial intelligence systems, producing
works eligible for patent protection.43 Nevertheless, although
creative robots easily meet the first two criteria, the demand of
originality may be troublesome, especially when facing the
subjective approach to originality. Intellectual property rights
should be granted whenever eligible subject matter meets these
standards.44 We argue that creative robots, because of their
fundamental ten features, and as long as we adopt the objective
concept of originality, can easily fulfill all three criteria. Once no
intention to create is needed, since they can produce new and
creative works, creative robots might be entitled to copyrights
for their inventions.
B. THE MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE CURRENT (TRADITIONAL)
COPYRIGHT REGIME
Creative robots’ works are not currently unquestionably
eligible because copyright law is perceived as intended for
human authors only.45 We claim that the current (traditional)

41. Copyright Basics, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF. 1 (Sept. 2017), https://www
.copyright.gov/circs/circ01.pdf; see also National Copyright Guidelines,
Requirements for Copyright Protection, SMARTCOPYING, http://www
.smartcopying.edu.au/copyright-guidelines/copyright---a-general-overview/1-4requirements-for-copyright-protection (claiming that “fixed in a tangible
medium” means the work is not just an idea in someone’s head, rather, to be
copyrightable, the work must have a tangible physical representation). Ideas
are not copyrightable, only the execution or expression of those ideas, which
usually occurs once words are written on a page, paint is placed on a canvas,
doodles drawn on a napkin, or even an image captured by the digital sensor of
a camera or copied to a disk or cloud drive. Id.
42. Copyright Office’s Compendium, § 300, Copyrightable Authorship 1–2
(2017); Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 25.
43. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03, 112 (2012); Ryan Abbott, I Think, Therefore I
Invent: Creative Computers and the Future of Patent Law, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1079
(2016); Pamela Samuelson, Allocating Ownership Rights in ComputerGenerated Works, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1185 (1985).
44. For a detailed discussion, see infra Part IV.
45. Yanisky-Ravid & Moorhead, supra note 40.
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legal regime focuses only on what was relevant in the past,
namely the human authors behind the creative process. When
this traditional approach has been implemented for assessing
robots’ creations, policymakers have considered the human
behind the creative robot’s works and declared that person to be
the creator and therefore entitled to copyright protection.46
However, in the case of creative robots’ works—when robots act
autonomously and independently to create entirely new works—
the traditional approach reflects a misunderstanding about the
way in which creative robots function. Applying this approach to
creative robots calls for revisiting the term “originality.”
Adopting the objective approach to originality is a necessary step
toward the recognition of creative robots as legal entities, similar
to the way firms are recognized as legal entities and hence
capable of holding copyrights by themselves.
C. THE PROGRAMMERS OF AI SOFTWARE AND THE ARTWORKS
PRODUCED BY CREATIVE ROBOTS
One could argue against this conclusion by claiming that the
programmers of the AI software should be considered the
authors of the creative robots’ works. Following the traditional
approach of identifying the human author behind the creative
robot, this human programmer or operator would then be
entitled to the copyrights.47
For traditional artwork, the creator is entitled to copyright
as soon as the work is created.48 Generally speaking, the
algorithms that power the next generation of creative AI
systems are the product of many participants. But once
produced, the creative robot is capable of producing works by
itself. Assuming humans (rather than AI systems) created the
AI software program, could the software programmer be entitled
to the copyright of works created by the AI system?

46. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–02; Jonathan R. Tung, Who Owns the Creation of an
Artificial Intelligence?, TECHNOLOGIST (Aug. 22, 2016), http://blogs.findlaw.com
/technologist/2016/08/who-owns-the-creation-of-an-artificial-intelligence.html
(“Current intellectual property law in this country does not allow and does not
recognize machines as ‘individuals.’ The legal fiction has not yet been invented.
Fine, so machines don’t own what they make.”).
47. Yanisky-Ravid & Moorhead, supra note 40, at 31–32.
48. Copyright Basics, supra note 41, at 4.

2018]

COPYRIGHTABILITY OF ARTWORKS

15

Copyright laws usually protect software.49 The software
industry has been developing and flourishing rapidly.50 As
discussed infra Section II.B, the Constitution delegates to
Congress the power to grant exclusive rights to “Authors and
Inventors” in their respective “Writings and Discoveries.”51 The
constitutional inquiries regarding copyright thus become (1)
identifying an author and (2) identifying a writing. The AI
software that powers creative robots triggers copyright
protection because software code is one of the “Writings”
protected by the Constitution.52 One might conclude that AIgenerated art, separately from the AI software itself, can be
regarded as proper “works of authorship” pursuant to Section
102 of the Copyright Act53 because AI has a sufficient nexus to
human creativity. The traditional approach to the Copyright
Act, however, provides copyright protection under certain
conditions.54 In order to be entitled to copyright registration, a
work must have its origin in human authorship. Thus, works
produced by mechanical processes or random selection—without
any contribution from a human author—are not entitled to
protection.55
D. ARE ARTWORKS PRODUCED BY CREATIVE ROBOTS DERIVATIVE
WORKS?
The question whether works of art produced by creative
advanced technology systems are derivative works was raised in
the complaint filed by Rearden LLC and Rearden Mova LLC
49. See Christopher M. Holman, Copyright for Engineered DNA: An Idea
Whose Time Has Come?, 113 W. VA. L. REV. 699, 702 (2011).
50. Pamela Samuelson, Evolving Conceptions of Copyright Subject Matter,
78 U. PITT. L. REV. 17, 64 (2016).
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
52. See id.
53. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
54. Copyright Office’s Compendium II, § 503.03(a), Works Not Originated
by a Human Author (“In order to be entitled to copyright registration, a work
must be the product of human authorship. Works produced by mechanical
processes or random selection without any contribution by a human author are
not registrable. Thus, a linoleum floor covering featuring a multicolored pebble
design which was produced by a mechanical process in unrepeatable, random
patterns, is not registrable. Similarly, a work owing its form to the forces of
nature and lacking human authorship is not registrable; thus, for example, a
piece of driftwood even if polished and mounted is not registrable.”).
55. Id.
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against The Walt Disney Company. In this case the plaintiff
claims that characters, such as the animal-like face of the Beast
(in the movie Beauty and the Beast) which were generated
through unique Oscar-winning effects using a system called
MOVA, are derivative works that belong, together with other
derivative works, to Rearden, which owns Mova technology.56
According to the Rearden lawsuit, “Disney used the stolen
MOVA Contour systems and methods, made derivative works,
and reproduced, distributed, performed, and displayed at
least Guardians of the Galaxy, Avengers: Age of Ultron,
and Beauty and the Beast, in knowing or willfully blind violation
of Rearden Mova LLC’s intellectual property rights.”57
The claim is based on the legal paradigm of derivative
works, which might assume that the output of a computer
program or system is a derivative work of the owner of the
copyrighted program or patented system. According to U.S.
Copyright law, the holder of the copyright would hold the
copyright for the output too.58 This approach is supported by the
U.S. Supreme Court.59 This conclusion in regard to creative
robots’ production reflects the assumption that a computer
requires a significant amount of input from a human user in
order to generate artistic output. Congress repeated this idea
when it established the National Commission on New
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU), in regard,
among other issues, to authorship of computer-generated
works.60 CONTU concluded that authorship rights ought to go
to the user when the user makes a substantial contribution to
the computer’s output.
Nevertheless, in contrast to the traditional approach to
copyright law, we argue that sophisticated, advanced AI systems
pose more complicated and challenging questions. This is due to

56. Complaint, Rearden LLC v. Walt Disney Co., No. 3:17-cv-04006 (N.D.
Cal. Filed July 17, 2017).
57. Id. at 3.
58. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
59. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973) (interpreting the
authorship requirement of the Copyright Act to include “any physical rendering
of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor.”).
60. See NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW TECH. USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS,
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES
OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS (July 31, 1978).
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the fact that the question of who owns the works produced by
creative robots is distinct from the question of who owns the
robots and the technology itself. When the computer produces
most of the output independently and creatively, without
copying or infringing on other authors’ rights, then it is less
likely that the owner might be considered as the original source
of the work.
Therefore, the approach of derivative works argued by
Rearden is not necessarily a winning strategy, as we are not sure
whether the works are actually derivatives or if they stand alone
as new and creative artworks. Moreover, if a human being
involved in the process were to provide some input that affected
the artwork being generated, such as by exposing the robot to
new data, then the final work may be the result of another
human’s creative input. Therefore this human, rather than the
programmer or the owner of the robot, may be entitled to
copyright protection for the composition. Accordingly, Disney
can argue that the figure of the Beast as well as others are the
result of Disney’s human contribution, such as the
cinematographer, director, and actors.61
In this article, we do not challenge the programmer’s
entitlement to ownership of the software according to copyright
laws. Nevertheless, we do challenge the idea that this
entitlement automatically results in the programmer owning the
products and processes created by the AI system.
Can a robot be the originator of artwork? The term
“originality” has the potential to decide the case in favor of one
side or the other. On one hand, we can decide to nullify copyright
law as inapplicable, irrelevant, and outdated. On the other hand,
once we decide to maintain the copyright regime, we should
rethink threshold concepts, such as originality, and give them
61. See also Anna Gaca, “The World’s First Songs Composed by Artificial
Intelligence” Are Neither First nor Entirely Artificial, SPIN (Sept. 22, 2016),
http://www.spin.com/2016/09/first-song-written-by-ai-really-isnt (“Researchers
at Sony’s Computer Science Laboratory in Paris have shared a pair of tracks
created with the assistance of software called Flow Machines. The program
analyzes a database of existing songs to ‘learn’ musical styles and identify
commonalities, then ‘[exploits] unique combinations of style transfer,
optimization, and interaction techniques’ to synthesize original music.
Researchers can tailor the process to produce tunes that sound like the work of
a particular artist—for example, ‘Daddy’s Car,’ which is intended to emulate
the style of the Beatles[.]”).
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new meanings so they can cope with the 3A era as well as, in our
discussion, a digital author of artworks as the original one. This
attitude might better reflect the understanding of creative
robots and how they function. As the first and most important
step, we should start by rethinking the meaning of originality.
II. DEFINING THE UNDEFINED—THE ORIGINALITY
REQUIREMENT
A. THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARD IN THE BERNE CONVENTION
In order to decide who is the author and if a creative robot
can be an author, one must first address the question of
originality. This is true in the United States as well as around
the globe. Therefore, the international meaning of “originality”
is crucial. The Berne Convention (the Convention), which
entered into force on December 5, 1887,62 plays an important role
in copyright protection. The Berne Convention is one of the main
sources of international copyright eligibility matters.63 The text
of the Convention encouraged two basic principles that continue
to resonate today: the establishment of a Union concept and the
principle of national treatment.64 However, the question of what
legal requirements should be adopted nationally for the
protection of literary and artistic works has resulted in
inconsistency.65
The Convention primarily protects the works of authors who
are citizens of member-states to the Convention, but it also
provides for the enjoyment of such protections in all other
62. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT 34 (2010).
63. As of 2017, 175 states are parties to the Berne Convention. See WIPOAdministered Treaties, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int
/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?treaty_id=15. Article 1 of the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) requires all
WTO members to provide copyright protections embedded, inter alia, in the
principles of Berne Convention. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, art. 1, Jan. 1, 1995, 33 I.L.M. 1197.
64. Ralph Oman, The United States and the Berne Union: An Extended
Courtship, 3 J.L. & TECH. 71, 72 (1988); Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works, Paris Act, art. 1, July 24, 1971, reprinted in
GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 62, at App’x 1 (2010) (“The countries to
which this Convention applies constitute a Union for the protection of the rights
of authors in their literary and artistic works.”).
65. Oman, supra note 64, at 93.
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member-states.66 Through this principle, called the
“nationalization of the international,”67 the Convention purports
to be “open to all countries of the world and capable, by means
of periodic revision, of keeping pace with juridical, technical and
economic change.”68 This nationalization was meant to protect
works created by human beings, but looking for an author who
is a citizen might make it impossible to implement the
originality standard when creative robots create original,
artistic works. Even if this hurdle were to be overcome, in order
to acquire protection, a work must comply with basic
requirements, including originality. The term originality—
although it is one of the basic requirements for acquiring
copyright protection—is actually undefined. There exists neither
an international definition of the concept of originality nor any
standard that member-states could adopt nationally.69 On the
contrary, every member-state has to create its own national
concept of, and standard for, originality.70

66. Id. at 73.
67. See id. (describing the principle of “national treatment” or the
“assimilation of the foreigner to the national”).
68. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION
FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS 9 (1978); see also
Oman, supra note 64, at 73 (noting that the agreement that formed the Union
was one that made the members “open to all countries of the world . . . keeping
pace with juridical, technical and economic change . . . . [A]uthors who are
subjects or citizens of any Union country should enjoy, in all other member
countries, the same protection for their works as those countries accord their
own authors.”). It was explained above that the Convention concedes to its
members the enjoyment of similar copyright protection in all member countries.
Does this mean that coexistence of different originality requirements is
possible? If the standard in one member country is higher than that in another
member country, how are they supposed to offer the same protection? Is it
logical to have different definitions and standards among countries while
providing the same protections? Does this system encourage artists to export
their talents to countries that offer lower standards or ones that provide a more
concrete definition of the originality concept? This article envisions the logic
behind having at least a general descriptive idea of what exactly constitutes
originality in artworks.
69. See Diana Rhoten & Walter W. Powell, The Frontiers of Intellectual
Property: Expanded Protection Versus New Models of Open Science, 3 ANN. REV.
L. & SOC. SCI. 345 (2007) (arguing that just as the public and private spheres of
science may be converging, so must future scholarship if we are to answer
harder questions about the appropriate balance between traditional logics of
open science and the more recent regimes of proprietary science).
70. See id.
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If legal professionals believe that “[c]opyright treaties
simply do not exist in isolation from the domestic copyright laws
of states party to such treaties,”71 then it is understandable that
a harmonized legal environment will require the most basic
principles to be defined. Originality is clearly among such
fundamental concepts, yet its precise meaning remains elusive.
The Convention allegedly defines the subject matter of its
protection, sets minimum rights and requirements giving rise to
such protection, and establishes the rule of national treatment
and the independence of copyright protection among states of the
Union from protection in the country of origin.72 Yet, a shrewd
reading of the Convention’s articles demonstrates that it lacks
an express definition or standard for “originality” as a legal term
of art.
The Convention does protect specific subject matter, namely
the “rights of authors in their literary and artistic works.”73 The
Convention lists a number of types of works that, as a minimum
standard, member-states must include as protected works.74
However, the Convention does not include a definition or a
standard for the concept of originality that could guide memberstates by explaining why or how originality in works should be

71. Oman, supra note 64, at 77.
72. Id. at 76–77 (discussing the content of the Articles of the Convention,
which also “enumerate certain minimum economic and moral rights of authors
with respect to the use of their works; establish specific opportunities to exempt
certain uses from the exclusive rights guaranteed by the Convention; set down
special provisions taking account of the unique circumstances surrounding the
creation and dissemination of motion pictures; and govern retroactive
application of the Convention.”).
73. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
Paris Act, art. 2(1), July 24, 1971, reprinted in GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ,
supra note 62, at App’x 1 (2010).
74. See id. (stating that protected works should include “every production
in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form
of its expression, such as books, pamphlets and other writings; lectures,
addresses, sermons and other works of the same nature; dramatic or dramaticomusical works; choreographic works and entertainments in dumb show;
musical compositions with or without words; cinematographic works to which
are assimilated works expressed by a process analogous to cinematography;
works of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving and lithography;
photographic works to which are assimilated works expressed by a process
analogous to photography; works of applied art; illustrations, maps, plans,
sketches and three-dimensional works relative to geography, topography,
architecture or science.”).
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protected. The only constant expression regarding originality is
the phrase “shall be protected as original works.”75 But what is
an “original work” under the Convention?
One could imagine that copyrightable works produced by
creative robots could be classified as “derivative works” of the
original AI software. It is therefore interesting to pinpoint the
international concept of derivative works. Although the Berne
Convention covers the concept of originality, the article that
covers derivative works does not define “originality.”76 This
article clearly mandates that original works, even those based
on copyrighted underlying works, should be protected:
“Translations, adaptations, arrangements of music and other
alterations of a literary or artistic work shall be protected as
original works without prejudice to the copyright in the original
work.”77 The only reference to originality in derivative works is
embedded in the phrase “protected as original works without
prejudice to the copyright in the original work.”78 This section,
too, lacks a definition of, or standard for, original works with
which member-states could distinguish the new, original works
produced by humans and by digital tools, such as creative robots,
from the underlying works. As a result, member-states currently
have the freedom to establish their own originality standards
and definitions for derivative works that acquire protection.
The broad language of the Berne Convention thus provides
member-states some “leeway” in determining the conditions for
receiving protection.79 But is it actually helpful for states to have
such leeway in defining the originality requirement for
protection? If the goal of the Berne Convention is to harmonize
the protection of copyrightable works internationally, then
uncertainty over a basic requirement will naturally lead
member-states to clarify the law nationally. This results in
diverse standards and definitions throughout the memberstates. This uncertainty regarding the fundamental definition of
75. Id. at art. 2(3); see also id. at 14bis(1).
76. Id. at art. 2(3).
77. Id. (noting that the use of the word “original” refers to underlying
works).
78. Id. Those original works created from the alteration or transformation
of the underlying work acquire a separate protection from the one that the
underlying work already has.
79. GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 62, at 39.
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“originality” in the international arena is mirrored in national
legal systems, like the one in the United States.80
B. THE STANDARD IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM
1. Originality as a Constitutional Concept
The Constitution of the United States establishes the
Federal Government’s right to legislate regarding copyrights
and patents: “Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”81 The language of the
Constitution promotes the creation of knowledge.82 The legal
support for creation is tied to economic incentives, which allow
the authors of works to hold a monopoly-like right for a period of
time.83 This economic incentive, fulfilled by a Congress
empowered to protect authors and their writings through
copyrights, resulted from “the conviction that encouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance
public welfare through the talents of authors . . . in ‘ . . . useful
Arts.’”84 The Constitution’s promotion of creation was motivated
by the Framers’ desire to guarantee people’s freedom to create
new works.85
Before the Copyright Act of 1976 was enacted, the Copyright
Act of 1909 provided protection for writings, but did not
expressly recognize originality as a requirement for protection.86
80. See id.
81. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
82. CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 20 (2010).
83. Id.
84. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); see also Steven S. Boyd,
Deriving Originality in Derivative Works: Considering the Quantum of
Originality Needed to Attain Copyright Protection in a Derivative Work, 40
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 325, 330 (2000) (citing Mazer v. Stein as part of the
discussion on originality as a constitutional and statutory prerequisite).
85. See Boyd, supra note 84; Christine Wallace, Note, Overlapping Interests
in Derivative Works and Compilations, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 103 (1985).
86. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 351
(1991) (citing 1 MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, COPYRIGHT §§ 2.01[A],
[B] (1990)) (“The Court’s decisions announcing this rule predate the Copyright
Act of 1909, but ambiguous language in the 1909 Act caused some lower courts
temporarily to lose sight of this requirement. The 1909 Act embodied the
originality requirement, but not as clearly as it might have.”).
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Instead, the concept of originality was governed by two wellknown Supreme Court cases describing originality from two
perspectives: “writings” and “authorship.”87 The In re
Trademarks Cases decision determined that originality is
required in writings.88 The Court explained that originality
requires independent effort plus a modicum of creativity:
[W]hile the word writings may be liberally construed, as it has been, to
include original designs for engravings, prints, [etc.], it is only such as
are original and are founded in the creative powers of the mind. The
writings which are to be protected are the fruits of intellectual labor,
embodied in the form of books, prints, engravings, and the like.89

In the Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony decision,90
originality was described from the author’s standpoint.91 The
Court defined “author” in a constitutional sense as “he to whom
anything owes its origin; originator; maker . . . .”92 The Court
described copyright as being limited to the “original intellectual
conceptions of the author,” and stressed the importance of
requiring an author who accuses another of infringement to
prove “the existence of those facts of originality, of intellectual
production, of thought, and conception . . . .”93
The originality requirement articulated by these two cases
remains “the touchstone of copyright protection”94 and the very
87. See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 82, at 84; Boyd, supra note 84, at 330–32
(making reference to the mainstay cases discussed in this paper).
88. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93–94 (1879).
89. Id. at 94; see also JOYCE ET AL., supra note 82, at 84.
90. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
91. Id. at 58. See also Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561–62 (1973)
(citing Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58) (“While an ‘author’ may be viewed as an
individual who writes an original composition, the term, in its constitutional
sense, has been construed to mean an ‘originator’”).
92. Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 57–58 (emphasis added) (discussing the scope
of “writings” under the Constitution and stating that “[b]y writings in that
clause is meant the literary productions of those authors, and [C]ongress very
properly has declared these to include all forms of writing, printing, engravings,
etchings, etc., by which the ideas in the mind of the author are given visible
expression”).
93. Id. at 59–60 (listing a number of facts that proved the original
conception in a photograph of the author: “by posing the said Oscar Wilde in
front of the camera, selecting and arranging the costume, draperies, and other
various accessories in said photograph, arranging the subject so as to present
graceful outlines, arranging and disposing the light and shade, suggesting and
evoking the desired expression, and from such disposition, arrangement, or
representation, made entirely by plaintiff, he produced the picture in suit”).
94. See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 82, at 86.
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“premise of copyright law.”95 In other words, “[t]he originality
requirement is constitutionally mandated for all works.”96
Although it is quite clear that originality is a substantive
requirement for receiving copyright protection, there is no clear
definition of originality for creative works.97 Moreover, the case
law makes it seem like originality is based only on authors who
are human beings.98 Therefore, creative works produced by
creative robots might not be subject to copyright protection at
all.
2. Originality as a Statutory Concept
The important concept of originality appears throughout the
Copyright Act of 1976 and judicial opinions interpreting it.99 We
argue that the absence of an express statutory definition has led
to the current legal micro-disparity between judicial opinions
within the United States, which reflects the macro-inconsistency
between member-states of the Berne Convention.
Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976 clearly
establishes that “copyright protection subsists . . . in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression
. . . .”100 Although the Act identifies when protection subsists and
expressly recognizes protection for originality, we state that the
definition of “original works” remains unclear. Indeed, the
congressional intent behind the Copyright Act was to leave the
originality concept undefined in order to clear the path for courts
to maintain their existing standards of originality.101 It was

95. See Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir.
1981) (referring to the concept of originality as the establishment of the scope
of protection in copyrights, which extends to the expression of facts and not the
facts themselves); JOYCE ET AL., supra note 82, at 84.
96. L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of
Copyright Protection for Law Reports and Standing Compilations, 36 UCLA L.
REV. 719, 763 n.155 (1989).
97. See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 82, at 84.
98. Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 57–58.
99. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (using the term “original” to define other
statutory terms).
100. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
101. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976), as reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664.
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Congress’s intent to avoid enlarging the contemporary standard
of copyright protection.102
One could argue that congressional inaction should be
understood as increasing uncertainty while opening the door for
courts to manipulate the standard to a higher or lower degree
when they deem it to be necessary. According to some scholars,
Congress intended, through the Copyright Act, to broaden the
range of eligible subject matter and also to align it with the
requirements of the Berne Convention.103 Regardless of what
Congress intended, it is clear that the result has been
uncertainty regarding the meaning of “originality.”
3. Originality as a Standard for Works
The uncertainty over the exact definition of originality gives
courts freedom in determining which works will be entitled to
receive copyright protection.104 The lack of uniformity and
formality in the originality standard in the United States relates
to the subject matter of the work created by the author.105 U.S.
courts have modified the originality standard when it seems
unsuited to the subject matter at hand.106 This raises the
question of whether the standard should be dependent on the
degree of creativity demanded by the type of work. Recently,
courts have tended to fight this inconsistency by incorporating
the same standard for all types of works.107 However, we propose
that courts ought to adopt a higher, more formal standard.

102. See id. (establishing that “[t]his standard does not include
requirements of novelty, ingenuity, or esthetic merit, and there is no intention
to enlarge the standard of copyright protection to require them”).
103. See J. H. Reichman, Goldstein on Copyright Law: A Realist’s Approach
to a Technological Age, 43 STAN. L. REV. 943, 951–53 (1991) (including a citation
of the legislative history to sustain his position, although the passing of the
Copyright Act of 1976 was before the adherence of the United States to the
Berne Convention and there was no mention of the Convention in the legislative
history of the Act).
104. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976).
105. See id.
106. See Reichman, supra note 103, at 952 (setting as an example the case
of L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1976), which
employed a quantitative creativity test).
107. Ryan Littrell, Toward a Stricter Originality Standard for Copyright
Law, 43 B.C. L. REV. 193, 196 (2002) (emphasizing the law’s loose standard for
originality).
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a. The Current, Lower Originality Standard for Works
“[T]he one pervading element prerequisite to copyright
protection regardless of the form of the work” is the requirement
of originality.108 One can understand originality as being
undefined in many ways. Originality means that the work must
be the original product of the claimant.109 An original work is
one that is new or novel and, therefore, not a reproduction, clone,
forgery, or derivative work.110 In other words, “[o]riginality
means that the work owes its creation to the author and this in
turn means that the work must not consist of actual copying.”111
The originality test consists of “something more than a ‘merely
trivial’ variation, something recognizably ‘his own.’”112
An original work stands out because it is not a mere
reflection of the work of others. However, “[t]he originality
requirement for copyright protection is not particularly
rigorous.”113 U.S. courts’ standard of originality demands the
author’s independent conception and a low quantum of creativity
that he or she employed in his or her work.114 A work is original
if it is the independent creation of its author. A work is creative
if it embodies some modest amount of intellectual labor.115 Thus,
creativity is deeply connected to the originality concept and an
author needs to invest some intellectual effort to create a work
independently. But is this requirement of effort or creativity
necessary?
108. L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 489–90 (2d Cir. 1976); see
also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 86, at § 10, at 32 (1975).
109. Batlin, 536 F.2d at 489–90; see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 86,
at § 10, at 32.
110. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 86, at § 2.01.
111. Batlin, 536 F.2d at 490; see also Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts,
Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102–03 (2d Cir. 1951); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures
Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936), aff’d, 309 U.S. 390 (1940).
112. Batlin, 536 F.2d at 490 (citing Alfred Bell & Co., 191 F.2d at 103).
113. Greenspan v. Random House, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 2d 206, 216 (D. Mass.
2012).
114. See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 82, at 82.
115. See Durham Indus. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 911 (2d Cir. 1980);
accord Donald v. Zack Meyer’s T.V. Sales & Service, 426 F.2d 1027, 1029–30
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971); see also Batlin, 536 F.2d at
490 (citing Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Grossbardt, 436 F.2d 315, 316
(2d Cir. 1970)) (discussing the quantitative test of originality and characterizing
it as “modest,” “minimal,” and as establishing a “low threshold”); Puddu v.
Buonamici Statuary, Inc., 450 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1971).
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In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,
the Court clarified the general originality standard and
suggested a “minimal degree of creativity” test.116 According to
the Court, “the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even
a slight amount will suffice.”117 “[O]riginality requires
independent creation plus a modicum of creativity”,118 which
should be present in a work for it to be protected.119
The Court’s establishment of a low originality standard did
not result in as much efficiency as they intended because lower
courts have struggled to develop a neutral standard for original
works. The flexibility bestowed on courts burdens authors, who
must defend the effort and labor they employed, especially in
artworks for which a high level of skill is required and there are
no formal guidelines for addressing the resemblance of works
from a descriptive perspective. The legal reality is that the
originality standard could vary depending on the subject matter
to which the standard would be applied.
b. Is a Higher Standard Needed for Works?
While a higher standard is not really needed for
determining originality in artwork, a more formal standard
could ameliorate the problems discussed above. For
professionals in the intellectual property field, the minimum
originality standard (i.e. “a modicum of creativity requirement”)
is applied for first generation works,120 even though these works
are also exposed to preexisting material.121 Courts demand a
higher originality standard (i.e. “more rigorous amount of

116. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
117. Id. at 345.
118. See id.; see also Batlin, 536 F.2d at 346 (citing NIMMER & NIMMER,
supra note 86, § 10.2, at 36).
119. See Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805
F.2d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 1986).
120. See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 82, at 220 (describing that first-generation
works are considered to be the original works of authorship “composed
essentially of materials created by their authors”).
121. See Boyd, supra note 84, at 342 (discussing the standard for first
generation works and establishing that it “appears to generate bright-line rules,
even if those rules depend ultimately on the author’s prior exposure to
previously existing materials”).
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creativity”) for second-generation works.122 Section 101 of the
Copyright Act of 1976 defines a derivative work:
[A] work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization,
motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction,
abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be
recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial
revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications, which, as
a whole, represent an original work of authorship . . . .123

In explaining the subject matter of derivative works in
Section 103 of the Copyright Act,124 in addition to its definition
in Section 101, Congress intended “to define, more sharply and
clearly than does section 7 of the [1909 Act], the important
interrelationship and correlation between protection of
preexisting and of ‘new’ material in a particular work.”125
Congress clarified the scope of protection for derivative works by
establishing that “copyright in a ‘new version’ covers only the
material added by the later author, and has no effect one way or
the other on the copyright or public domain status of the
preexisting material.”126 The statute thus makes clear that a
derivative work is not new, but something added to a preexisting
work.127

122. See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 82, at 220. The second-generation works
are the ones based on preexisting matter. See Boyd, supra note 84, at 342–43
(establishing that courts require a more rigorous amount of creativity,
“implying that a different quantum of originality may be required depending on
the type of work involved”).
123. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (emphasis added) (defining derivative works).
124. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2012) (establishing the subject matter for derivative
works: “(a) The subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes
compilations and derivative works, but protection for a work employing
preexisting material in which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of
the work in which such material has been used unlawfully. (b) The copyright in
a compilation or derivative work extends only to the material contributed by the
author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material employed
in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material.
The copyright in such work is independent of, and does not affect or enlarge the
scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright protection in the
preexisting material.”).
125. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 57-58 (1976), as reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670–71; JOYCE ET AL., supra note 82, at 221.
126. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 57–58; JOYCE ET AL., supra note 82, at
221.
127. See Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 521 (7th Cir.
2009).
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There is inconsistency within the U.S. legal system
regarding the standards to be applied to “first generation” works
and derivative works. Although recent cases have established
that the same originality standard applies to any kind of works
(i.e. minimal element of creativity over and above the
requirement of independent effort),128 a well-known art law case
decided by Judge Posner proposed a higher originality standard
for derivative works. Gracen v. Bradford Exchange involved an
invitational competition in which the artists submitted
paintings depicting the character Dorothy from the MetroGoldwyn-Mayer (MGM) movie The Wizard of Oz.129 A still
photograph of the character, which was given as an exemplar,
inspired the artists to depict a realistic Dorothy.130 According to
the competition rules, the artist who submitted the best painting
would be chosen to work on a series of collector’s plates.131
Gracen (who might be replaced by a creative robot nowadays)
won the competition but did not sign the contract that would
allow her painting to be used on the collector’s plates.132 The
sponsor of the competition hired another artist to create a
similar plate.133 Gracen sued the sponsor, MGM, and the other
artist they hired for copyright infringement.134 Judge Posner,
ignoring the modest quantum for originality and the descriptive
elements normally used to prove the quantum,135 established a
new standard for artworks and derivative works: “If Miss Gracen
had painted Judy Garland from life, her painting would be
copyrightable even if we thought it kitsch; but a derivative work
must be substantially different from the underlying work to be
128. FragranceNet.com, Inc. v. FragranceX.com, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 2d 312,
325 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
129. Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 301 (7th Cir. 1983).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 302.
135. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59–60 (1884)
(listing a number of facts that proved the original conception in a photograph of
the author: “by posing the said Oscar Wilde in front of the camera, selecting and
arranging the costume, draperies, and other various accessories in said
photograph, arranging the subject so as to present graceful outlines, arranging
and disposing the light and shade, suggesting and evoking the desired
expression, and from such disposition, arrangement, or representation, made
entirely by plaintiff, he produced the picture in suit”).
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copyrightable.”136 According to Judge Posner, the en banc
decision in Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder required a higher
standard for derivative works.137 Judge Posner even suggested
that all cases establishing a liberal test should be considered
“superseded.”138 The court considered a hypothetical example to
explain its concern about a low quantum for derivative works:
Artist A produces a reproduction of the Mona Lisa, a painting in the
public domain . . . B also makes a reproduction of the Mona
Lisa . . . [I]f the difference between the original and A’s reproduction
is slight, the difference between A’s and B’s reproductions will also be
slight, so that if B had access to A’s reproductions the trier of fact will
be hard-pressed to decide whether B was copying A or copying the
Mona Lisa itself.139

In the more recent case of Schrock v. Learning Curve
International, Inc., the same federal court accepted as valid the
concern presented by Gracen.140 But it clarified the originality
standard:
[N]othing in the Copyright Act suggests that derivative works are
subject to a more exacting originality requirement than other works
of authorship . . . “[T]he only ‘originality’ required for [a] new work to
be copyrightable . . . is enough expressive variation from publicdomain or other existing works to enable the new work to be readily
distinguished from its predecessors.”141

The lack of a fundamental justification for elevating the
standard only for artworks and derivative works resulted in
courts retaining the current lower standard for all works.
However, in addressing the concerns articulated in Gracen,
Judge Sykes articulated some principles that must be followed
when dealing with derivative works: “(1) the originality
requirement for derivative works is not more demanding than the
originality requirement for other works; and (2) the key inquiry is
whether there is sufficient nontrivial expressive variation in the
derivative work to make it distinguishable from the underlying

136. Gracen, 698 F.2d at 305 (emphasis added).
137. Id. (citing L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir.
1976) (en banc)).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 304.
140. Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 521 (7th Cir. 2009).
141. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co.,
329 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2003)).
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work in some meaningful way.”142 These principles will be
considered by our proposal infra Section III.B.
III. ADDRESSING FORMALITY FOR ORIGINALITY OF
ARTWORKS
A. COMPARING OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE APPROACHES TO
ORIGINALITY
When one considers artwork created by creative robots, even
more questions arise. From a legal standpoint, the Copyright Act
of 1976 defines a work of visual art only by reference to a list of
protected subject matter.143 Just as the legislation only broadly
identifies “originality” as requiring independent effort and a
modicum of creativity, it does not have a concrete definition for
artwork. When thinking about works created by creative robots,
we cannot avoid considering what makes art original. This is a
specific question that demands a narrow answer. “In order to be
acceptable as a [pictorial, graphic, or sculptural] work of art, the
work must embody some creative authorship in its delineation
or form.”144 How can a delineation or form be quantified as
creative? Originality in artworks requires a formal descriptive
framework that connects the artist’s intention to the expression
that he or she conveys through his or her work. The framework
142. Id. (emphasis added) (“This focus on the presence of nontrivial
‘distinguishable variation’ adequately captures the concerns articulated in
Gracen without unduly narrowing the copyrightability of derivative works.”).
143. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“A ‘work of visual art’ is—(1) a painting,
drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a limited edition of 200
copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author, or,
in the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated sculptures of
200 or fewer that are consecutively numbered by the author and bear the
signature or other identifying mark of the author; or (2) a still photographic
image produced for exhibition purposes only, existing in a single copy that is
signed by the author, or in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are
signed and consecutively numbered by the author.”); see also Stéphanie Giry,
An Odd Bird, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Sept.–Oct. 2002, reprinted in PATTY
GERSTENBLITH, ART, CULTURAL HERITAGE AND THE LAW: CASES & MATERIALS
10 (Carolina Academy Press, 2d ed. 2008) (“[S]culptures qualified as art works
only if they were ‘chisel[ed]’ or ‘carve[d]’ ‘imitations of natural objects,’ chiefly
the human form representing such objects ‘in their true proportions.’”).
144. Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 800 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (quoting
37 C.F.R. § 202.10(b)); see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“[Pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works] shall include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their
form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned . . . .”).
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should also include observations by the audience responsible for
capturing, decoding, and comparing the expression depicted by
the artist.
Judge Leval has criticized the lack of a formal framework,
albeit with respect to a different issue in copyright law. He
argues for the establishment of formal guidelines for the “fair
use” analysis.145 Applying his reasoning to the fundamental
concept of originality, it is evident that determinations of
originality should also follow a set framework.146 The current
legal environment is driven toward a definition that better
describes how to attain originality (a quantum focus) rather than
how to perceive originality (emphasizing a descriptive focus
without reaching the aesthetic).147 As a result, it is difficult for
judges and juries to make determinations of originality in
artworks using the current standard.148
In redefining the standard for originality, we argue that it
is important to encourage a uniform analysis in judicial
determinations for artworks and, perhaps, to promote the same
analysis for all works (created either by humans or by creative
robots). Under this approach, a work would be declared as
original under the laws of all member-states of the Berne
Convention. Originality affects the artwork itself as well as the
designated authorship of the work. Furthermore, originality
could be affected by the audience’s perception of the work.149
145. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105
(1990).
146. See id. at 1105 (discussing the inconsistency of the “fair use” doctrine)
(“Is this because no rational defining values exist, or is it rather that judges,
like me, have repeatedly adjudicated upon ad hoc perceptions of justice without
a permanent framework?”).
147. See Reichman, supra note 103, at 954 (acknowledging the inquiry of
whether the originality requirement implies a quantitative or qualitative
threshold of creativity and also explaining that he reviews the lengthening list
of cases that have sought some quantum of creativity beyond independent
creation and the possibility that courts applied a qualitative standard).
148. Giry, supra note 143 (discussing the case Brancusi v. United States, 54
Treas. Dec. 428 (Cust. Ct. 1928) which involved an issue regarding the
definitions of an “original sculpture” or a metal “article or ware not specially
provided for” under the 1922 Tariff Act) (“For the [sculpture] to enter the
country duty-free under the act, [the] lawyers had to prove that Brancusi was a
professional sculptor; that the [sculpture] was a work of art; that it was original;
and that it had no practical purpose.”).
149. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992) (first quoting
Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d Cir. 1966); then quoting
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There are many factors to consider when developing an
acceptable legal standard for copyrighted artworks that could
refer to the works of creative robots as well. Our interest in
conceiving a formal originality standard internationally led us
to incorporate relevant legal concepts into this proposal.
First, we encourage the division of the descriptive analysis
into two spheres: the subjective and the objective.150
Incorporating this general overview into the legal framework
could create a more coherent, general, and descriptive concept of
originality. Some elements that influence originality are
included in the proposal to separate the risk of an aesthetic
analysis in artworks, not approved by judges,151 from the more
descriptive originality analysis proposed below. Factors such as
the interpretation by the audience and the resemblance of an
artwork to preexisting works, when taken as a whole, could lead
to an efficient originality determination.
Whereas the factor of an artist’s intent, which focuses on the
artist’s mind and soul, reveals immeasurable elements, the
audience’s perspective may lead to a more efficient tool. An
artist’s intent includes his or her hidden feelings and motivation
for the expression, which could be to create an entirely new
work, to reflect ideas inspired by other works, or to replicate the
expression of a pre-existing work. By contrast, an audience’s
interpretation of a work has to comply with a reasonable,
objective perspective. In other words, the “audience” may be
defined as an average observer (a concept found in the
substantial similarity test)152 who makes a reasonable
Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir.
1960)).
150. See S.T.S., Oct. 26, 1992 (J.T.S., No. 914, p. 7972) (Spain) (addressing
how originality is treated from both the subjective and objective standpoint).
151. See Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 304 (7th Cir. 1983).
152. The substantial similarity test has been applied differently by U.S.
courts. ROBERT C. OSTERBERG & ERIC C. OSTERBERG, SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY
IN COPYRIGHT LAW § 3, at 3-2 (Practising Law Inst. 2003). The approach
proposed in this article combines elements taken from the tests applied for
infringement by the Second, Fourth and Ninth Circuits. See id. § 3, at 3-2 to -3
(summarizing all of the approaches applied by the U.S. circuit courts). The
Second Circuit applies the “substantial similarity test,” which the Osterbergs
summarize: “the court tests to see whether the defendant had access to
plaintiff’s work at the time defendant prepared his work, and whether there is
sufficient similarity between the works to prove copying.” Id. at § 3.1.1, at 3-3
(first citing Laureyssens v. Idea Grp., Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 1992);
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comparison of the work in question to pre-existing works. To
determine the resemblance of an artwork to other works, the
audience could compare details that “jump to the eye” of a lay
observer.153 Originality in artworks has to vary distinguishably
if there is some resemblance to preexisting works.154 Adopting
then citing Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946)). The Ninth
Circuit, in Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1990), applied the
Extrinsic/Intrinsic Test. The intrinsic test is considered a “subjective analysis
of expression” (i.e., “no more than the visceral reaction of the lay observer, and
as such is ‘virtually devoid of analysis’”). OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra, §
3.2.1.B, at 3-26 (citing Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1357). The extrinsic test, on the other
hand, is treated as an “objective analysis of expression.” Id. It suggests that
courts must list the elements of the works and determine whether
there is any similarity . . . For works of visual art, the criteria include
shapes, colors, and arrangements of the representations in addition to
the type of artwork involved, the materials used, the subject matter
and the setting for the subject.
Id. (footnote omitted) (first citing Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1362; then citing Cavalier
v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 826 (9th Cir. 2002)). The Fourth Circuit’s
test is similar to the Ninth Circuit’s test, but it establishes that “a plaintiff must
show—typically with the aid of expert testimony—that the works in question
are extrinsically similar because they contain substantially similar elements
that are subject to copyright protection.” Id. § 3.2.2, at 3-35 (quoting Towler v.
Sayles, 76 F.3d 576, 583 (4th Cir. 1996)). Their difference rests on the intrinsic
part in which the Fourth Circuit tests similarity by means of the “intended
audience” test. Id. § 3.2.2, at 3-36 (first citing Towler, 76 F.3d at 579; then citing
Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1990)).
153. The Second Circuit’s philosophy of the substantial similarity test
focuses on the “ordinary observer” and applies it “where the plaintiff’s work is
wholly original, that is, where the work does not incorporate public domain or
other noncopyrightable material.” OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 152, §
3.1.1.A, at 3-4 (first citing Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 271–72 (2d
Cir. 2001); then citing Laureyssens v. Idea Grp. Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 140 (2d Cir.
1992)). One question accompanies this element: “would the ordinary observer,
unless he set out to detect the disparities, be disposed to overlook those
disparities and regard the aesthetic appeal of the two works as the same?” Id. §
3.1.1.A, at 3-5 (first citing Horgan v. MacMillan, Inc., 789 F.2d 157, 162 (2d Cir.
1986); then citing Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487,
489 (2d Cir. 1960)). The Fourth Circuit is considered to be the minority test, and
it is the only one (among the tests already mentioned) that substitutes the
“ordinary observer” for the “intended audience.” Id. § 3.2.2.D, at 3-41 to -42 (first
citing Airframe Sys., Inc. v. L-3 Comm. Corp., 658 F.3d 100, 106 n.7 (1st Cir.
2010); then citing Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 943 (10th Cir.
2002) cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1066 (2002)). The intended audience is “the
perspective of the group that is the market for the work, that is, the work’s
intended audience.” Id. § 3.2.2.A, at 3-36 (citing Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc.,
905 F.2d 731, 736–37 (4th Cir. 1990)).
154. See Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 521 (7th Cir.
2009). Although “[t]his focus on the presence of nontrivial ‘distinguishable
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an objective perspective of originality would enable judges and
juries to evaluate works made not only by humans, who act with
intention, but also works created by creative robots, for which it
remains difficult to understand the concept of consciousness and
intention.155
Second, considering the general impression that the legal
field has for works of art,156 there is a need to analyze the
doctrine of derivative works through this objective lens. Because
derivative works entail transformation of a prior work, the gap
between the originality concept and transformation has to be
addressed by transformativeness from a “fair use” standpoint. In
other words, we claim that the creator’s subjective intention to
make a derivative work is irrelevant. The decision regarding
derivative works should be made based on objective similarities
to the original work even though derivative works are usually
produced with a different medium (e.g. a play based on a book).
The derivative work, when it includes major copyright-protected
elements of the first work, would be entitled to the copyright
holder of the first work. For example, deciding whether the song
“Pretty Woman” by 2 Live Crew was an unauthorized derivative
work should be based on objective criteria rather than on the
intentions or feelings of 2 Live Crew. The same logic and
preference for objective rules is true when deciding whether the
song is a parody and, hence, enjoys the fair use defense.157
Similarly, and perhaps more importantly, the objective criterion
is inevitable for Internet or computer-generated works as there
are no subjective feelings involved.158
variation’ adequately captures the concerns articulated in Gracen without
unduly narrowing the copyrightability of derivative works,” the proposal
recognizes that some of the artworks are inspired by preexisting works and need
to be distinguishable. Id.
155. See John Markoff, The Rapid Advance of Artificial Intelligence, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/15/technology/therapid-advance-of-artificial-intelligence.html.
156. See, e.g., Giry, supra note 143, at 100 (“In a non-technical sense, most
works of art are derivative in that they either depict another work of art or an
element of nature.”).
157. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 596 (1994) (holding
that 2 Live Crew’s commercial parody may be a fair use within the meaning of
Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act).
158. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007)
(finding that the search engine serves a different function and added an
additional benefit to the public).
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B. A FORMAL, DESCRIPTIVE APPROACH FOR ORIGINALITY IN
ARTWORK
1. The Difficulties of Implementing the Subjective Approach
The artist’s intent could be defined as the force that drives
the artist to invest his or her independent effort to create an
artwork. Intention, for the purpose of determining originality, is
the artist’s determination to create a specific work.159 But
sometimes the artist’s intent for a creation could be different
from the actual work resulting from his or her effort. For
example, Ms. Gimenez’s inner intention for “restoration”
resulted in a “botched” work, but one that was also an entirely
new painting.160 Circuit Judge Frank, in Chamberlin v. Uris
Sales Corp., determined that even though the plaintiff copied a
drawing from a traditional board game, “[i]f one made an
unintentional error in copying which he perceived to add
distinctiveness to the product, he might perhaps obtain a valid
copyright on his copy . . . .”161 Judge Frank added, “although the
question would then arise whether originality is precluded by
lack of intention. That question we need not consider. For
plaintiff’s error yields nothing new of substance or distinction.
Without originality, his drawing, if it stood lone, could not be the
subject of a valid copyright.”162
Should originality be precluded by lack of intention? Or
should lack of intention to copy be considered proof of
originality? Courts have demonstrated that the artist’s intent
must be considered when analyzing copying or infringement. In
Rogers v. Koons, a plaintiff photographer sued a defendant
sculptor for borrowing the plaintiff’s photograph that captured a
happy couple holding a litter of puppies.163 The plaintiff
demonstrated that the defendant intentionally copied the
plaintiff’s work by presenting evidence that the defendant sent
notes to his artisans remarking how he wanted the sculpture to
159. Intent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining “intent” in the
context of criminal law and the law of evidence) (“Purpose; formulated design;
a resolve to do or forbear a particular act; aim; determination.”).
160. Neild, supra note 31.
161. Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512, 513 (2d Cir. 1945).
162. Id. (footnote omitted) (describing the variations as “so minute as to
escape the attention of the ordinary observer”).
163. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 303 (2d Cir. 1992).
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resemble the plaintiff’s photograph.164 This evidence not only
provided proof of unauthorized copying, but also established
that, in fact, the defendant did copy the preexisting work.165
According to the court, it proved that the defendant’s intent was
to produce a non-original work.166
Although the concepts of idea and intent attend to the
artist’s state of mind, these concepts are interpreted differently
depending on whether the court is judging whether an artwork
should receive protection or judging whether the artwork
infringes another work.167 When courts assess infringement,
they consider the artist’s intent as a factor in their decisions.168
For example, the Rogers case involved a small black and white
photograph and a large polychrome wooden sculpture.169 The
case suggested that, to find copying on visual grounds, the court
must ignore scale, color, and materials—i.e., the court must
ignore how the artist made the artwork.170 The Second Circuit’s
164. Id. at 305 (“In his ‘production notes’ Koons stressed that he wanted
‘Puppies’ copied faithfully in the sculpture. For example, he told his artisans
the ‘work must be just like photo—features of photo must be captured;’ later,
‘puppies need detail in fur. Details—Just Like Photo!;’ other notes instruct the
artisans to ‘keep man in angle of photo—mild lean to side & mildly forward—
same for woman,’ to ‘keep woman’s big smile,’ and to ‘keep [the sculpture] very,
very realistic;’ others state, ‘Girl’s nose is too small. Please make larger as per
photo;’ another reminds the artisans that ‘The puppies must have variation in
fur as per photo—not just large area of paint—variation as per photo.’”).
165. Id. at 307 (“His instructions invariably implored that the creation must
be designed ‘as per photo.’ This undisputed direct evidence of copying is
sufficient to support the district court’s granting of summary judgment.”).
166. Id. at 308 (“No genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to this
finding; ‘String of Puppies’ was copied from the photograph ‘Puppies’ based
either on the direct evidence of copying or on proof of access and substantial
similarity.”).
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See id. How can the court ignore the scale, color, and materials of the
sculpture yet evaluate these elements of originality in a sculpture represented
in a photograph? Do courts take into consideration the originality lower
standard that acknowledges effort even if it is accidentally perpetrated? The
substantial similarity test has many flaws. It is difficult to consider that courts
are not partial when they evaluate works and hunt for similarities with the
allegedly infringed-upon work. Courts should analyze the differences between
both the allegedly infringed and the infringing artwork. Looking only for
similarities in the allegedly infringed work could be detrimental because courts
will have a preconceived idea in favor of the allegedly infringed artwork. To
remedy this, the courts should adopt a difference test instead of a similarity
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ruling relied on its observations of black and white photographs
of both works, thus ignoring the qualities of the sculpture (i.e.,
size, color) that made it different from the photograph.171 This
method “enhanced [the two works’] similarities and prevented
the court from appreciating the aesthetic impact of the
sculpture. The court was willing to treat a small, colorless
picture of the sculpture as conveying all the relevant meaning,
literally flattening its judgment.”172 Consequently, the notes
between Koons and his associates discussing the use of the
photograph, which was presented as evidence of Koons’s
intention, could be considered a cop-out by the court in analyzing
what is original and different about the derivative work because
the court was reluctant to analyze the works’ differences and
inclined to find only similarities.173 This leads to the problem of
intention, which should come into play if an artist’s intent is to
make a lot of money on someone else’s creative work.
Conversely, in Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc.,174
Judge Frank analyzed whether the defendants, who knew of
existing copyrights, infringed plaintiff’s copyright for mezzotint
test, which will initiate a more neutral process. The analysis in Cariou v. Prince,
714 F.3d 694, 706 (2d Cir. 2013), provides an example favoring an evaluation of
differences, rather than similarities, of artworks. Albeit a fair use analysis, the
court acknowledged those elements that make an artwork different from the
allegedly infringing work:
These twenty-five of Prince’s artworks manifest an entirely different
aesthetic from Cariou’s photographs. Where Cariou’s serene and
deliberately composed portraits and landscape photographs depict the
natural beauty of Rastafarians and their surrounding environs,
Prince’s crude and jarring works, on the other hand, are hectic and
provocative. Cariou’s black-and-white photographs were printed in a 9
1/2” x 12” book. Prince has created collages on canvas that incorporate
color, feature distorted human and other forms and settings, and
measure between ten and nearly a hundred times the size of the
photographs. Prince’s composition, presentation, scale, color palette,
and media are fundamentally different and new compared to the
photographs, as is the expressive nature of Prince’s work.
171. See Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of
Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683, 721 (2012) (citing Heather J. Meeker,
Comment, The Ineluctable Modality of the Visible: Fair Use and Fine Arts in the
Post-Modern Era, 10 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 195, 225 (1993) (citing a
telephone interview with curator John Caldwell, who reports that audiences’
experiences of seeing the Koons sculpture are far different from those they
expect based on reading about it or seeing pictures of it)).
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
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engravings of a painting. The defendant alleged that, because
the plaintiff copied works in the public domain, plaintiff could
not seek copyrights for his reproductions.175 Judge Frank
explained that reproduction of works of art could be protected
“while prohibiting a copyright of ‘the original text of any
work . . . in the public domain . . . .’”176 In this case, the plaintiff
presented evidence to prove defendant’s intent to copy, and
defendant presented evidence of his intent not to copy the work.
Judge Frank established that “[t]here is evidence that [plaintiffs’
works] were not intended to, and did not, imitate the paintings
they reproduced,”177 but he also concluded that, “on the findings,
again well grounded in the evidence, we see no possible doubt
that defendants, who did deliberately copy the mezzotints, are
infringers.”178 Judge Frank recognized that unintentional
departures from preexisting works could be considered original
works:
[E]ven if their substantial departures from the paintings were
inadvertent, the copyrights would be valid. A copyist’s bad eyesight or
defective musculature, or a shock caused by a clap of thunder, may
yield sufficiently distinguishable variations. Having hit upon such a
variation unintentionally, the “author” may adopt it as his and
copyright it.179

When assessing copyright protection, the artist’s idea is
always evaluated in conjunction with his or her expression.180
The artist’s idea relates to the depiction of a particular subject
in a particular way on a tangible expression (i.e. “how the artist
depicts it”).181 But what happens if the artist’s intention is to
depict another artist’s vision of that same subject? For copyright
protection, one cannot separate the idea from its expression.
However, for infringement considerations, courts tend to
evaluate the artist’s intention (i.e. what the artist is depicting)
175. Id.
176. Id. at 104 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 5 (2012)) ( “[N]ot only does the Act include
‘Reproductions of a work or art’, but—while prohibiting a copyright of ‘the
original text of any work in the public domain’—it explicitly provides for the
copyrighting of ‘translations, or other versions of works in the public domain’.”).
177. Id. at 104–05.
178. Id. at 105.
179. Id.
180. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
181. Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F.Supp. 2d 444, 458 (S.D.N.Y.
2005); see also Tushnet, supra note 171, at 715 (citing Mannion, 377 F. Supp.
2d at 458).
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without considering the idea and its expression. Courts often
forget that, for either the protection or infringement tests, the
idea leads to creativity in the expression (i.e., uniqueness), but
the intention triggers that idea. If the idea and the intention are
not considered jointly, a contradiction will exist when analyzing
originality.182
Based on the discourse in these cases regarding the
subjective approach to originality, we argue that the subjective
analysis might be troublesome because it is an immeasurable
criterion. The artist’s intentions, at the end of the day, are
mostly (if not completely) hidden and unknown. Therefore, to
avoid confusion and speculation, we contend that courts should
adopt the objective approach. Furthermore, once courts reject
the subjective approach, they might open the door for finding
that works produced by creative robots are original.183
2. The Objective Approach
a. The Audience’s Interpretation of a Work
Who should decide whether an artwork possesses originality
of its own as compared to preexisting works? U.S. courts have
struggled to determine which audience provides adequate
feedback for judging an artwork. In Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co., for example, Justice Holmes delivered an
182. See Tushnet, supra note 171, at 739–40. If we analyze infringement
without concentrating on whether the artwork is actually original, it could lead
to many issues, including applying incorrectly the similarity test to works that
are not identical. Tushnet encourages the “factfinder to focus on differences
between the works, not similarities, contrary to current doctrine[,]” which
would better assist the court’s analysis. This approach could provide for a more
just decision by focusing on the degree of differences and recognizing the efforts
of both artists. For example, in the case of Cecilia Gimenez, discussed supra
Introduction, if we observe the differences between the two paintings without
focusing on the similarities, we will conclude that Ms. Gimenez’s work is a new
one. But it would take only one simple similarity (in this case, the tangible
medium of the painting) to grant derivative rights to the owner of the earlier
painting whereas the differences would grant the artist of the new work
reproduction rights.
183. On linguistic creativity, musical creativity, and visual and artistic
creativity, see THE ART OF ARTIFICIAL EVOLUTION: A HANDBOOK ON
EVOLUTIONARY ART AND MUSIC (Juan Romero & Penousal Machado eds., 2008);
DAVID COPE, COMPUTER MODELS OF MUSICAL CREATIVITY (2006); David Cope,
Experiments in Music Intelligence (EMI), INT’L COMPUTER MUSIC ASS’N PROC.
(1987).
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opinion that found pictorial illustrations, used for
advertisement, to be original and protected by copyright.184
Justice Holmes sought to characterize an adequate audience as
one that could decide the value of the artwork, but the only way
that he was able to describe the audience was to use two groups
at opposite extremes.185
The first audience that Justice Holmes described was the
professional one trained only in the law (the trier of law): “It
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to
the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of
pictorial illustrations, outside the narrowest and most obvious
limits.”186 He further considered the drawbacks of this audience:
At the one extreme, some works of genius would be sure to miss
appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the
public had learned the new language in which their author spoke. It
may be more than doubted, for instance, whether the etchings of Goya
or the paintings of Manet would have been sure of protection when
seen for the first time.187

Justice Holmes’s decision suggests a reasonable degree of
reliance, by the Court, on the general public’s (the trier of facts)
knowledge in determining the originality of artworks.
The second audience considered by the Justice was “a public
less educated” in comparison to legal professionals:
At the other end, copyright would be denied to pictures which
appealed to a public less educated than the judge. Yet if they
command the interest of any public, they have a commercial value,—
it would be bold to say that they have not an aesthetic and educational
value,—and the taste of any public is not to be treated with
contempt.188

Justice Holmes’s decision might incline courts to seek a
more subjective opinion when evaluating artworks by
considering the public’s aesthetical interpretation instead of
deciding objectively or describing the elements necessary to
comply with an objective result to protect artworks based on
their originality. Indeed, although the Court’s remarks about the
audience that interprets artworks suggest a subjective solution,
shifting the focus from the intention of the creator to the
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
See id.
Id. at 251.
Id.
Id. at 251–52.
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audience already reflects a more objective approach. This shift
was important for future tests for analyzing originality.
The Second Circuit has included an observer’s test when
discussing substantial similarity in artworks.189 The observer’s
test is useful for addressing copyright infringement, providing
the following inquiry: whether “the ordinary observer, unless he
set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook
them, and regard their aesthetic appeal as the same.”190 This
Circuit has also established the requirement for the audience
deciding originality of a work as “the decision-maker, whether it
be a judge or a jury, need not to have any special skills other
than to be a reasonable and average lay person.”191
For artworks, is it permissible to rely on the interpretation
of an audience that is intellectually average? There is not an
exact definition of what is an “artwork” or “art.” 192 For the
audience to consider a work as art and to have the same
interpretation for the work as the author, both the audience and
the author need to be identically connected to the subject
depicted in the work.193 Although recognizing art in works could
189. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that
substantial similarity does not require literally identical copying of every
detail); see also OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 152.
190. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 488 (2d
Cir. 1960).
191. Koons, 960 F.2d at 308.
192. See Giry, supra note 143.
193. This is an impossible test given the inconsistencies in perception and
psychology of the audience. On perception and realism, see NEAL FEIGENSON &
CHRISTINA SPIESEL, LAW ON DISPLAY 9–10 (2009) (footnote omitted) (“People
tend (again, initially and unreflectively) to conflate representations with direct
perceptions of reality, to ‘look through’ the mediation at what is depicted. To see
the picture is to see the real thing, unmediated. What a picture depicts just
seems to have presence, a kind of being in the world. As a consequence, the
meaning of the picture is understood to be identical to its content. The realism
in this way of understanding pictures is the entirely plausible belief that (most)
descriptive, documentary pictures that purport to describe external reality
actually do so, if incompletely; the naïveté comes from ignoring how [to
paraphrase Marshall McLuhan] the medium affects the message—how the
meanings a picture conveys are shaped by the tools, techniques, and social
contexts of representation.”); Tushnet, supra note 171, at 693 (“Even though
there is both historical and cross-cultural evidence that perceptions of the
correspondence of images with reality vary depending on the viewer’s
background and knowledge, the default is to treat images as real, and people
have a corresponding difficulty analyzing them as images that are distinct from
what they (purport to) represent.”); see also Giry, supra note 143 (discussing the
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depend on the knowledge of the people who evaluate the works,
most viewers are naïve—they mistake the work for its subject
and they do not see the material, the means, and the cultural
context behind it.194 That does not mean that an audience is
incapable of enjoying the work, but demanding that the audience
evaluating the originality of an artwork have above-average
knowledge would be unreasonable. Moreover, it could lead to an
aesthetic analysis (i.e. an isolated appreciation of beauty)
instead of an observation and acknowledgment of the artist’s
effort with the artwork’s originality and distinction.195 A change
questions the judge asked the plaintiff, including, “[W]hat makes you call the
sculpture a bird, does it look like a bird to you?” To which the plaintiff
responded, “[I]t does not look like a bird but I feel that it is a bird, it is
characterized by the artist as a bird.”). Including the audience’s feelings
regarding an interpretation of an artwork risks having the audience fall into an
aesthetic value analysis instead of an originality descriptive approach. Thus,
under the approach proposed by this article, the intention of the artist must be
considered. See, e.g., DEWITT H. PARKER, THE PRINCIPLES OF AESTHETICS 53
(2012) (“To this material, secondly, are attached vague feelings. It is
characteristic of aesthetic expressions, as we have observed, that their media,
quite apart from anything that they may mean or represent, are expressive of
moods—the colors of a painting have a stimmung, so have tones and words,
when rhythmically composed.”).
194. See Giry, supra note 143 (citing the sculptor Brancusi: “In art, one does
not aim for simplicity. One achieves it unintentionally as one gets closer to the
real meaning of things.”); see also FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 193, at 8–
9 (defining naïve realism as “[t]he intuitive tendency to believe in whatever
things, events, or ideas a picture (perhaps especially a descriptive, documentary
picture) depicts or suggests—that is, to be more inclined, at least initially, to
accept pictures than words as reliable evidence of reality—derives from two
closely related habits of mind that, singly or in combination, may be called naïve
realism”).
195. Adopting a subjective perspective for determining the artist’s intention
will, at least, diminish the possibility of an aesthetic analysis that relies only
on the subjectivity of the observer. See Gracen v. Bradford Exchange, 698 F.2d
300, 304 (7th Cir. 1983); see also PARKER, supra note 193, at 59–60 (“There are
two characteristics of aesthetic feeling in its relation to sensations and ideas,
which must be taken into account in any explanation; its objectification in them,
and the universality of this connection. . . . The feelings have become true
attributes. It is only by analysis that we pick them out, separate them from the
other elements of idea or sensation in the whole, and then, for the purpose of
scientific explanation, inquire how they came to be connected.”); Christine
Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79 TUL. L. REV. 805, 809 n.10 (2005) (describing the
meaning of aesthetics); Tushnet, supra note 171, at 723 n.186 (“Copyright
plaintiffs have not generally offered courts extrinsic evidence of how ordinary
observers perceive the meaning of a particular work. The Ninth Circuit
explicitly rejected reliance on a consumer survey to determine whether a
particular accused work was a parody. Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods.,
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in the intellectual knowledge—demanding expertise in the art
form—of the audience who observes, decodes, and decides if an
artwork is original could lead to a change in the quantum
necessary to achieve originality. Art per se calls for a deeply
emotional analysis, in addition to technical knowledge, and
demands more than a rational and objective analysis when
considering its originality.196
b. The Resemblance of a New Artwork to Preexisting Works
When the federal court in Koons analyzed the originality of
the sculpture made by the defendant, and whether he copied the
plaintiff’s work, it acknowledged an important conclusion in
favor of the plaintiff: “in terms of his unique expression of the
subject matter captured in the photograph, plaintiff has
established valid ownership of a copyright in an original work of
art.”197 Although the court found a substantial similarity,198
353 F.3d 792, 801 (9th Cir. 2003). My argument is certainly not that copyright
laws need more surveys—that would just mean more words to fight about, since
surveys can always be contested—but rather that copyright’s epistemology is
sharply limited by courts’ attempts to fix a singular meaning without
interrogating their own assumptions about how images, music, and so on make
their meanings.”).
196. See Gracen, 698 F.2d at 304 (citing SUPER REALISM: A CRITICAL
ANTHOLOGY (Gregory Battcock ed., 1975)) (“But artistic originality is not the
same thing as the legal concept of originality in the Copyright Act. Artistic
originality indeed might inhere in a detail, a nuance, a shading too small to be
apprehended by a judge. A contemporary school of art known as ‘Super Realism’
attempts with some success to make paintings that are indistinguishable to the
eye from color photographs.”); PARKER, supra note 193, at 59 (explaining how
sensations and feelings are considered in an aesthetic analysis: “From a
psychological standpoint, sensation is the datum of the aesthetic experience, the
first thing there, while its power to express depends upon a further process
which links it up with thoughts and feelings. We must inquire, therefore, how
this linkage takes place—how, for example, it comes about that the colors of a
painting are something more than mere colors, being, in addition, embodiments
of trees and sky and foliage, and of liveliness and gayety and other feelings
appropriate to a spring landscape. Let us consider the linkage with feeling
first.”).
197. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992) (emphasis added)
(citing Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884)) (listing
the elements of originality in a photograph as “posing the subjects, lighting,
angle, selection of film and camera, evoking the desired expression, and almost
any other variant involved”).
198. Id. (analyzing if there was infringement under the substantial
similarity test); see also Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod., Inc. v. McDonald’s
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977) (establishing an extrinsic and
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uniqueness was important for the protection of the artist’s
expression of an idea: “What is protected is the original or unique
way that an author expresses those ideas, concepts, principles or
processes.”199
In L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder,200 the Second Circuit
explained that a genuine difference has to exist between the
underlying work and the alleged copy that seeks protection.201
The essence of the test provides the audience with tools for
identifying the genuine difference needed to comply with the
constitutional principle. Thus, to assess the resemblance
between two artworks, one must understand not only what
constitutes small differences between the two works, but also
when a work is deemed totally dissimilar from the other.202 “It is
only where the points of dissimilarity exceed those that are
similar and those similar are—when compared to the original
work—of small import quantitatively or qualitatively that a
finding of no infringement is appropriate.”203 When assessing
resemblance, differences must be distinguishable from other
works.204 We would define distinguishing features as the details
in the artwork that “jump to the eye” of an observer.205

intrinsic test to find substantial similarity and determining that the test of
similarity is a factual one decided by the trier of fact).
199. Koons, 960 F.2d at 308.
200. L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976).
201. Id. at 492; see also Bridgeman Art Library v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp.
2d 191, 196 n.36 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (establishing that if a genuine difference is
absent, the public interest in promoting progress of arts could hardly be served).
202. See Koons, 960 F.2d at 308 (citing 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 86,
§ 13.03[B][1][a]).
203. Id.
204. See Batlin, 536 F.2d at 490 (citing Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris &
Bendien, Inc., 23 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1927)).
205. This article uses the phrase “jump to the eye” to refer to the audience’s
perception of singularities in an artwork that are “distinguishable to the eye.”
See Tushnet, supra note 171, at 690 (“Images are more vivid and engaging than
mere words, decreasing our capacity to assess images critically because we are
more involved in reacting to them. And, because we process images so quickly
and generally, we may stop looking before we realize that critical thought
should be applied to them.”); FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 193, at 7
(describing the effect of visual images compared to reading words and how the
eye retains visual information: “Consider, for instance, how we see a continuous
visual field even though our retinas receive no input at the ‘blind spot’ where
the optic nerve connects to the eye. . . . But we can enter a picture anywhere we
want to, drawn to any feature of it that catches our eye, whether the attraction
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Applying this approach to the example of Ms. Cecilia
Gimenez and the “botched” fresco, one must conclude that Ms.
Gimenez created an entirely new work. The audience—the
viewers of her fresco—considered the artwork to be a new work
because they perceived it as fully original. The name given to the
work by the audience, Ecce Mono, reflects their interpretation of
the painting as resembling a monkey, thus providing proof of the
total originality of the work. The audience also generated
another title, Beast Jesus, for the piece, which acknowledged the
figure of “Jesus” in the painting. This perception is more aligned
with the conclusion that the work was a transformation—not a
new, original work.
A number of factors “jumped to the eye” of the audience and
motivated their conclusions about the artwork. These included:
the colors used for the new fresco were entirely different from
the original one; the physical appearance of the new creation was
totally different from the former painting (e.g. the eyes, the
beard, the hair, the nose, skin color); and the original fresco
depicted a realistic expression of the biblical figure, whereas the
new work depicted an unrealistic, cartoon-like expression. One
need not conduct a deep aesthetic analysis to conclude that this
transformation resulted in an original creation. The audience
found a level of creativity in the artwork higher than the mere
modicum required by the legal standard in the United States.206
It also grants the singularity of a new original artwork that could
be easily distinguished from the prior artwork. Should Ms.
Gimenez’s fresco be considered a transformation, alteration, or
modification (i.e. a derivative work), or a transformation of
purpose under “fair use”?
Considering that derivative works are modifications or
transformations of underlying original works of authorship,207
there should be at least some consideration of whether the Ecce
Mono was a partial or full transformation of the original
painting. A full transformation would lead to a new original
is based on our own interests and predilections, formal qualities of the picture
itself, or some combination thereof.”).
206. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 340 (1991)
(citing In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879)) (“For a particular work
to be classified ‘under the head of writing of authors,’ . . . ‘originality is
required.’”).
207. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining derivative works).
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work, separate from the preexisting one.208 However, a partial
transformation would lead to a derivative work, which would
receive protection only for the new original additions or
changes,209 insofar as those additions or changes do not infringe
on another work.210 Section 106(2) of the Copyright Act of 1976
provides for the ownership of this type of work: the “owner of
copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to
authorize . . . derivative works based upon the copyrighted
work.”211
According to the facts of this example, the church authorized
the “restoration” of the earlier original work,212 not for the
creation of a derivative work. If there had been no authorization
at all, then, according to section 106(2), there would have been
an unauthorized creation of a derivative work.213 But Ms.
Gimenez had authorization to apply her skills to the former
painting. Her creation was not meant to be a derivative work
and it did not result in a derivative work because the preexisting
work is not traceable to the new artwork.214 Rather, the
transformation was a complete change that resulted in a new
and different artwork.
Some professionals in the field have proposed a standard for
transformativeness based on the fair use analysis. They focus
not on the author’s intent, but rather on the reader’s reaction.215
In the art world, the author’s intention is considered to be an
important factor in originality and the constitution of the work
itself.216 Professor R. Anthony Reese, summarizing the tendency
of court decisions regarding the transformation of content and

208. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., supra note 68, at 9.
209. See Ty Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 2002).
210. See Giry, supra note 143, at 100.
211. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012).
212. The church did not provide any guidelines, nor did it make any requests
regarding how to restore the painting. The authorization was verbally
communicated.
213. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012).
214. See generally WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG, supra note 68.
215. See Laura A. Heymann, Everything Is Transformative: Fair Use and
Reader Response, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445, 448 (2008).
216. See SIMON STOKES, ART & COPYRIGHT 16 (2003) (citing the philosopher
Herbert Spencer and explaining that “[a] production of mental labour may be
regarded as property in a fuller sense than may be a product of bodily labour;
since that which constitutes its value is exclusively created by the worker”).
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the transformation of purpose, concluded that, for the fair use
analysis, the latter is far more important than the former.217
3. Adopting the Objective Approach
One might claim that it would be difficult to understand the
meaning of a work of art without considering the artist’s
intention as well as the audience’s interpretation.218 The
subjective perspective, nevertheless, focuses primarily on the
artist’s intention to create new artwork.219 But as the case of
Ecce Mono demonstrates, the artist’s purpose may be different
from the outcome. In that case, the artist’s stated intent was to
retouch the former painting and retain the resemblance of the
biblical figure of Jesus,220 but her work resulted in a
distinguishable painting, one that can only be attributed to the
artist’s skill and creativity.221
According to the quantum of originality standard
established by courts222 and an analysis of the artwork through
the formal assessment, Ms. Gimenez’s artwork is original and
therefore deserving of legal protection. The artwork can be
described as a novel painting that is distinguishable and
singular—in other words, a protectable expression of an idea. As
a result, Ms. Gimenez should be granted reproduction rights for
the artwork. Her creativity—the newness that added value to
the painting—must be compensated.223 The same conclusion

217. R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right,
31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 101, 119 (2008) (“In assessing transformativeness, the
courts generally emphasize the transformativeness of the defendant’s purpose
in using the underlying work, rather than any transformation (or lack thereof)
by the defendant of the content of the underlying work.”).
218. See, e.g., Giry, supra note 143.
219. Id.
220. However, the inexistence of an exact reference that provides the real
physical appearance of the biblical figure of Jesus is general knowledge. Thus,
could it be determined that the depiction of the physical appearance of “Jesus”
is available to the public domain?
221. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903)
(“No matter how poor artistically the ‘author’s’ addition, it is enough if it be his
own.”); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936),
aff’d, 309 U.S. 390 (1940).
222. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
223. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2012) (“Subject to sections 107 through 122, the
owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to
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should be reached for works created by creative robots.224 We
claim that, when discussing human beings as creators, we
cannot determine originality (based on subjective criteria) with
complete certainty, a conclusion that is also true for discussing
creative robots as creators.
IV. THE CURRENT-TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO WORKS
CREATED BY CREATIVE ROBOTS
Our conclusion is that the objective approach to originality
is necessary to considering creative robots as authors of
artworks they produce, once meeting the other criteria of
fixation and creativity. This conclusion returns us to the
question of the traditional approach regarding inventions made
by AI systems.225 According to our view, the works produced by
creative robots are original in their objective meaning.
Therefore, policymakers might grant the copyright to the
creative robot, much as would happen if a human or a firm were
the only author. But is this conclusion consistent with United
States law? Can creative robots be considered “authors”? Can
the works produced by creative robots be entitled to copyright
protection?
The United States Constitution explicitly refers to
individuals as authors.226 By its plain language, the Constitution
never considered non-human inventors. Precedents in related
intellectual property fields have not accepted non-humans, such
as machines or animals, as “creators” within the meaning of
copyright law. For example, a district court refused to find that
Naruto, a crested macaque, was the creator or author of the
“Monkey Selfies” at issue.227 The court stated that copyright
laws have no application to non-humans:
authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies
or phonorecords.”).
224. This argument assumes that the work created by a creative robot meets
all other criteria of copyrightable works (aside from the subjective perspective
of intention, which is also immeasurable in works created by humans).
225. Yanisky-Ravid & Moorhead, supra note 40.
226. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
227. See Naruto v. Slater, No. 15-CV-04324, 2016 WL 362231, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 28, 2016) (“The complaint, filed by the People for the Ethical
Treatment of Animals (‘PETA’) and Antje Engelhardt as ‘Next Friends,’ alleges
that defendants Slater, Blurb, Inc. (the ‘publisher’ of a book by Slater containing
the Monkey Selfies), and Wildlife Personalities, Ltd. (a United Kingdom
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[T]he Copyright Act does not ‘plainly’ extend the concept of authorship
or statutory standing to animals. To the contrary, there is no mention
of animals anywhere in the Act. The Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit
have repeatedly referred to ‘persons’ or ‘human beings’ when
analyzing authorship under the Act . . . I have not found, a single case
that
expands
the
definition
of
authors
to
include
animals . . . Specifically, the Copyright Office will not register works
produced by ‘nature, animals, or plants’ including, by specific
example, a ‘photograph taken by a monkey.’ . . . Naruto is not an
“author” within the meaning of the Copyright Act.228

We disagree with this approach. In order to avoid nullifying
copyright laws we have to modify the laws to adopt new
technologies. We think that the conclusion on whether or not
creative robots should be entitled to copyright in the works they
produce depends on whether one views originality from a
subjective or objective perspective. Our conclusion is that the
objective perspective of originality is a more measurable and
efficient tool than the subjective approach. This conclusion
implies that originality may not be a hurdle to recognizing works
created by autonomous creative robots as copyrightable.
CONCLUSION
The new realities of artificial intelligence have led us to
question the originality of works created by creative robots,
which might be copyrightable had they been made by humans.
This question invites us to rethink the concept of originality
generally. We argue that formalizing the concept of originality
will improve accuracy in analyzing which artworks merit
copyright protection in the digital era. Creating a uniform
standard of originality starts at the international level. The
Berne Convention was an important step for achieving
uniformity in copyright protection. However, the Berne
Convention contains broad language regarding the most
important requirement for copyright protection—originality.
This lack of a clear, specific definition of “originality” at the
international level provides countries with leeway to employ

company that, along with Slater, ‘falsely’ claims authorship of the Monkey
Selfies) violated Naruto’s copyright by displaying, advertising, and selling
copies of the Monkey Selfies.”). The district court dismissed the case, an appeal
was submitted, and a hearing was scheduled for June 2017. See id., appeal
docketed, No. 16-15469 (9th Cir. Mar. 21, 2016).
228. Id.
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their own national definitions of originality. The United States
legal system faces an additional, self-imposed constraint:
“Notwithstanding the need for monopoly protection of
intellectual creators to stimulate creativity and authorship,
excessively broad protection would stifle, rather than advance,
the objective.”229 Although the Constitution mandates copyright
protections for “useful arts,”230 Congress, through the Copyright
Act of 1976, maintained an undefined concept of originality.231
The judiciary has therefore been left to create its own standard
for originality: a minimum level of creativity is not sufficient to
confer originality in artworks.232
We have argued that originality should be determined by a
formal, objective approach.233 Under United States copyright
law, private property is protected because of the value it
possesses,234 but considering only value, not the level of
creativity and originality invested in the work, is unjust.
Appreciating the value more than the labor could lead to a purely
aesthetic analysis.235 United States jurisprudence specifically
deals with aesthetics in artwork.236 In proposing a more formal,
descriptive framework for artwork, this article suggests avoiding
the aesthetic approach (i.e. appreciation for beauty) currently
employed by judges.237 Judge Posner explains the aesthetic

229. Leval, supra note 145 (discussing reciprocity between creators and
society, the monopoly benefit conferred, and responding to the question, “If
copyright protection is necessary to achieve this goal, then why allow fair use?”).
Although Judge Leval discusses “fair use,” his legal reasoning in establishing a
permanent framework on excessively broad protection is similar to this article’s
aim in discussing the originality requirement. See id.
230. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
231. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
232. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345
(1991).
233. See STOKES, supra note 216, at 16 (“The general knowledge is that
principles of labor and skills invested in artwork create private property.”).
234. See id. at 16–17.
235. See PARKER, supra note 193, at 2 (“Without feeling for the values of
sensation, men may be sympathetic and intelligent, but they cannot be lovers
of the beautiful. They may, for example, appreciate the profound or interesting
ideas in poetry, but unless they can connect them with the rhythm-values of the
sounds of the words, they have only an intellectual or emotional, not an
aesthetic experience.”).
236. See Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. 340.
237. See Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 304 (7th Cir. 1983).
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approach: “artistic originality is not the same thing as the legal
concept of originality in the Copyright Act. Artistic originality
indeed might inhere in a detail, a nuance, a shading too small to
be apprehended by a judge.”238 The quantum of originality in
artworks should be determined by a descriptive analysis that
evaluates the expression without ignoring the effort.239
Applying our proposed framework to the facts of the Ecce
Mono demonstrates its soundness. From the subjective
perspective, Ms. Gimenez’s intent was to “restore” and not to
“create.” By contrast, from the objective perspective, the
audience did not consider her work to be a “restoration.” The
audience deemed her creation to be an entirely new artwork that
added value to the first work. “Many of the best value intangibles
are the results of moments of inspiration that involve little or no
apparent effort on the part of the person claiming the intangible.
The work of the perspiring, but not the inspired, ‘creator’ would
be protected by law.”240 The objective perspective thus captures
the external relationship between the expression, the audience’s
interpretation of the artwork, and the resemblance of the
expression to other works.
In addition to providing guidance to judges and juries, a
descriptive approach will pave the way for an impartial
originality standard. A formal, descriptive analysis is capable of
adapting to the specific facts of a case, including a digital author.
Due to the uncertainty, if not the complete lack of a formal
originality requirement in artworks, this article encourages
countries to implement permanent guidelines for assessing
originality in artworks. Such guidelines would produce more
uniform and just outcomes for artists, which would, in turn,
foster their continued creativity.241 Moreover, such a framework
238. Id.
239. Tushnet, supra note 171, at 723 (“I would add that it is the interaction
between aesthetics and truth or reality that generates so much of the difficulty,
which is why the problems are worst for images. Because we understand how
pictures work so poorly, yet experience them so powerfully, aesthetic choices
unpredictably appear either as creative (non-reality-based) decisions or as
simple transmissions of truth or facts.”).
240. See STOKES, supra note 216, at 13; Michael Spence, Passing Off and the
Misappropriation of Valuable Intangibles, 112 L.Q.R. 472, 487 (1996).
241. Tushnet, supra note 171, at 731 (“If we think painters, writers, and
other artists should be able to continue in their own style despite transferring
one or more copyrights, we need to revisit this conclusion. Both abstract ideas
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would make it possible, in case we would like to keep rather than
nullify copyright laws in the future, for the works produced by
creative robots to be copyrightable.242
This conclusion is just the first step. Once we recognize that
the works produced by creative robots might be copyrightable,
we must ask who, if anyone, should be entitled to hold the
copyright protection on behalf of the robots. Should we apply
traditional copyright laws to works created by creative robots or
should we create new legal tools? If the latter, should the tools
be international or national? What would happen in the case of
infringement by a creative robot? Can creative robots follow
ethical rules? Who should be responsible for pressing the stop
button on such machines? These questions reflect just the tip of
the iceberg of the new era we have entered. New studies and
further research are needed in order to avoid putting the cart
before the horses.

(styles) and specific subjects should remain available to all creators, because
representing the internal (such as the ideal bird, even if the ideal was formed
with reference to earlier paintings) is a key way of representing (the artist’s
understanding of) the world.”). The facts of the example discussed in this article
demonstrated that both artists depicted Jesus in their own style; one depicted
realism and the other depicted the artist’s own reality, which was inspired by
the earlier artwork (i.e. her own vision of Jesus).
242. Samuelson, supra note 50.

***

